La c.d. "Turkel Commission", ovvero la commissione incaricata di investigare sugli eventi del 31 maggio 2010, ha presentato il suo primo report.
Del documento evidenzio il passaggio che più ha attinenza con l'oggetto del blog e con le discussioni che si svilupparono successivamente all'evento. 
Anche questa commissione conferma quanto già sottolineato dall'inchiesta della commissione militare e cioè che vi furono carenze sia in fase di raccolta informativa che in fase di pianificazione.

"243. From the materials before the Commission, it appears that the Israeli authorities did not have a forewarning of the violent reception planned by the IHH. The inability to identify IHH intentions had a direct impact on the planning and implementation of the operation. However, the lack of appreciation of the threat was not exclusively the result of incomplete intelligence gathering. Throughout the planning process, whether looked at from a policy, operational, or legal perspective, the scenario of an organized force armed with lethal weapons actively resisting the boarding attempt appears not to have been considered. In part, this assumption appears to have resulted from anticipation that the participants in the flotilla were all peaceful civilians as was the case with previous flotillas on the same route.
While a certain level of violence was anticipated during the strategic discussions held prior to the operation, and the possibility that there might be firearms present was mentioned in these discussions, government witnesses appearing before the Commission had difficulty identifying exactly what that meant in a practical sense at the time.
The planners of the operation seem not to have believed that the use of force would be necessary, except perhaps in isolated cases of soldiers acting in self-defense. Whether driven by a lack of information; confidence in the ability of the Special Forces and other Israeli units involved to handle any unanticipated situation; or a sense of “routine” that may have developed regarding these types of operations (although it was clearly understood that this flotilla was different and presented new challenges), the planning appeared to end with the assumption that any violence would occur at the extreme lower end of the conflict spectrum. This had a direct impact on operational tactics, the Rules of Engagement, and training before the operation."