In un articolo pubblicato giorni fa su Foreign Policy nel quale si analizzano alcune dinamiche strategiche del cyberspazio evidenziando, al contempo, i limiti dell’assunto della superiorità dell’offesa sulla difesa, così famoso durante la Prima Guerra Mondiale. Niente di nuovo, sia chiaro, ma il parallelo storico è divertente (ed utile) come la canzone dei Morcheeba di qualche anno fa..
Scrivono Singer e Friedman:

The most important lesson researchers have learned in traditional offense-defense balances — and now in cybersecurity — is that the best defense actually is a good defense. Regardless of which side has the advantage, any steps that raise the capabilities of the defense make life harder on the offense and limit the incentives for attacks in the first place. In cybersecurity, these include any and all measures that tighten network security and aid in forensics to track back attackers.

[…] In the end, the focus on offense and defense obscures a crucial reality of modern-day cybersecurity that distinguishes it from World War I, or, even worse, the poorly thought-out Cold War parallels that too many leaders and commentators make.
In 1914 and again in 1945, the powers of the day ended up split into two alliances, worried that one or the other side would seize the offensive advantage. But much like the users of the broader Internet itself, cyberattackers and defenders today range from the more than 100 militaries that have built some kind of cybermilitary unit to large and small technology firms to collectives that join Anonymous netizens interested in everything from Internet Freedom to cute cat videos. The online world is hardly bipolar, and nor should our thinking on it be.
So when the question is how to protect your online glass house, buying a stone sharpening kit is certainly not the only answer.