L’ultimo Strategic Comments dell’International Institute for Strategic Studies londinese esplora le possibili motivazioni dietro l’azione di Putin in Ucraina. Nessun obiettivo strategico frutto di attenta pianificazione, secondo gli analisti dell’IISS, bensì la reazione ad una grave minaccia percepita: il consolidamento a Kiev di un governo filo-occidentale con la conseguente perdita della base di Sebastopoli e, soprattutto, l’entrata dell’Ucraina nella UE o addirittura nella NATO.
[…] Upon close examination, Moscow’s statements and decisions suggest that the annexation of Crimea and its actions in southern and eastern Ukraine were a reaction to the change in power in Ukraine in late February and the perceived threat to Russian interests that it represented.
On 21 February, Yanukovich and opposition leaders signed an EU-brokered agreement intended to end the political crisis, under which the country would return to the 2004 constitution limiting presidential powers, elections would be held, and occupations of streets and buildings would end. However, the agreement collapsed immediately as Yanukovich fled the capital and parliament voted on 22 February to remove him.
Putin and his inner circle appear to have believed that the collapse of the agreement resulted at least in part from a Western plot to install a loyal government in Kiev that included far-right leaders who could revoke Russia’s basing agreement in Crimea, quickly move Ukraine towards EU and NATO membership, repress the country’s Russian minority, and cut the links with Ukraine upon which Russia’s energy and military-industrial sectors depend.
In the final days of February, when Putin decided to insert special forces, paratroopers and other servicemen into Crimea, he was seeking to prevent a strategic setback in Kiev from becoming a strategic catastrophe: Russia’s nightmare scenario of being completely pushed out of Ukraine by the West. His decision was intended to secure the most important Russian physical assets in Ukraine, namely the Black Sea Fleet base, and to coerce the new Ukrainian authorities into accommodating Moscow’s broader interests in Ukraine. It reflected the desperation that came after all other levers available to Russia had proven useless: during the previous few months, it had tried nearly all the tools it had – economic coercion, massive economic assistance and diplomacy with the West – and all had failed to secure its interests.
The invasion had almost immediate knock-on effects on the ground. It released latent separatist sentiment among the majority of the Crimean population, and hardened the position of the new government in Kiev. In spite of Putin’s statements reaffirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity as late as 4 March, the invasion foreclosed options other than annexation.
That action, and the subsequent efforts to destabilise southern and eastern Ukraine, were therefore driven by the need to protect Russian interests in Ukraine, a foreign-policy priority that has always been of paramount importance. Russia seems determined not to stop until its interests are secure – and it remains to be seen whether the advent of a new Ukrainian president, due to be elected on 25 May, will alter Moscow’s approach. While much remains murky, the available evidence suggests that Russian leaders were reacting to a perceived threat to national interests in Ukraine as a result of the overthrow of Yanukovich. If he had remained president, Russia would not have undertaken its campaign.