Un dettagliato studio dell’Institute for the Study of War e dell’American Enteprise Institute analizza obiettivi e strategie iraniane nel conflitto siriano.
Dato l’importante ruolo di Damasco nella “posture” regionale iraniana, secondo gli autori il regime di Teheran lavora per puntellare Assad e per proteggere gli interessi iraniani qualora questi dovesse perdere il potere:
While working to preserve Assad, Iran is actively preparing to ensure a permissive environment post-Assad. As an Iraqi official who met with Qassem Suleimani explained, “The mission of Suleimani in Syria is complicated. It is not limited to protecting the regime from collapsing, rather it also has to preserve Iranian interests in Lebanon and Syria should the regime fall.”
Ultimately, Iran does not require control over significant amounts of territory in order to continue projecting influence in the Levant, and the Assad regime appears positioned to maintain critical lines of communication to Lebanese Hezbollah for the time being. Moreover, Iran likely intends to continue supporting regime remnants in Alawite-majority regions even after the regime collapses.
By embedding with regime military forces while simultaneously establishing proxy militant networks, Iran can work to drive the convergence between the remnants of the Syrian Army and progovernment militias. This combined force, allied with Lebanese Hezbollah and Shi‘a militant groups like AFAB, can continue to compete for limited territory within Syria and ensure that Iran remains able to project the force necessary to provide strategic depth and deterrence. Iran may achieve some success with this two-track strategy over the short to midterm, prolonging the conflict and creating conditions whereby it can retain some of its operational capacity in the Levant. The loss of Syria as a state ally, however, significantly limits Iran’s strategic depth.
The relatively limited zones that remain under the control of regime remnants will not provide Iran with the same level of deterrence, or political and economic support as Assad’s Syria had provided. As Syria’s ascendant opposition consolidates its gains over a longer time horizon, Iran’s post-Assad network in Syria will provide Iran only limited and increasingly jeopardized access to its Levantine proxies and partners.