Il RUSI Journal ha pubblicato nell’ultimo numero un articolo di Ivanka Barzashka nel quale l’autrice, ricercatrice del Centre for Science and Security Studies del King’s College, sintetizza un’analisi da lei compiuta sulla reale efficacia del sabotaggio ai danni dell’infrastruttura nucleare iraniana realizzato tramite il worm Stuxnet.
La Barzashka, che per il suo studio si è avvalsa di dati di pubblico dominio, ritiene che il worm abbia prodotto effetti molto ridotti (se non, addirittura, controproducenti) e che, quindi, sia stato ampiamente sopravvalutato dalla stampa internazionale.
Una posizione molto interessante perchè, qualora fosse confermata, motiverebbe, forse, un certo ripensamento sulle attuali potenzialità delle c.d. “cyber-weapon“.
Scrive la ricercatrice:

[…] IAEA data does not prove that Stuxnet infected Natanz, but neither does it rule out that possibility. Analysis of trends in centrifuge numbers shows a correlation between an unexplained drop in machines and the first Stuxnet attack in 2009, but not consecutive attacks – contrary to reports that the malware was wrecking Iranian machines in 2010. If sabotage did occur, it was short-lived and most likely happened between May and November 2009. The situation appears to have been under control by 2010. More significantly, Iran’s ability to successfully operate new machines was not hindered. Stuxnet’s effects have not simply ‘worn off’, as media have widely reported. The malware did not set back Iran’s enrichment programme, though perhaps it might have temporarily slowed down Iran’s rate of expansion. Most importantly, Stuxnet or no Stuxnet, ceteris paribus, Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity increased and, consequently,so did its nuclear-weapons potential. […]