Lo sostiene la società di analisi Aegis Advisory secondo la quale, comunque, il rischio di conflitto nella Penisola coreana rimane stabilmente elevato.

  […] Bellicose words from North Korea are nothing new. The question this time is whether its 30-year-old leader Kim Jong-un is ready, willing and able to start and fight an all-out war. Perhaps the best answer came a few days ago from White House spokesman Jay Carney, who spoke of the “gap between rhetoric and action”. Pyongyang has several motives for its recent actions. Provoking a conflict that would probably lead to its own annihilation (apart from anything else) is not one of them.

What does North Korea want? In terms of foreign policy objectives, it wants to test the new administration of Park Geun-hye in Seoul and gain the upper hand in that relationship; to win recognition from Washington as a nuclear state; and (probably) to secure economic aid. Its only strategy for achieving the above is intimidation. Internally, Pyongyang wants to unite its populace against an external threat, not least as state control over the economy and society is eroding. The stridency of the threats may partly be because the world is not responding by offering concessions, and also because Kim is under the influence of hardliners or just wants to look tough.

The risks of conflagration, as ever in Korea, are significant. With tensions so high, Seoul’s government has given military commanders direct authority to respond to any provocation, raising the spectre of a small-scale border incident that could swiftly escalate. Kim’s relative youth, inexperience and uncertain hold over his regime make the situation even more precarious.

Yet war remains unlikely. We have been here before: Pyongyang has previously used all the above tactics, bar the Kaesong lockout. And while the threats of military action have been more direct than usual, North Korea rarely gives advance notice of attacks, and no unusual military movements such as large-scale movements of troops or weapons have been detected. Moreover, Seoul’s strong stance could also deter provocations, while Washington in turn is likely to restrain South Korean forces from precipitate action. Most importantly, the Kim regime’s desire for self-preservation should forestall accidents leading to war. […]