Zbigniew Brzezinski, già consigliere per la sicurezza nazionale di Carter, ha appena pubblicato un nuovo libro: ” Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power“.
Il libro sembra molto interessante (qui un estratto dall’introduzione) ed è per questo che prossimamente lo analizzeremo insieme, in dettaglio, per meglio comprendere l’approccio geo-strategico di un settore importante dell’elites statunitense.
Nel frattempo, però, l’ex consigliere per la sicurezza nazionale di Carter ha rilasciato un’intervista per Huffington Post, ripresa parzialmente in Italia da La Stampa, nella quale, tra le altre cose, ha affermato:

Nathan Gardels: The core of your strategic vision for the future is of a “larger West” comprised of democratic powers that accommodates China. Yet the West, starting with the U.S., is in a period of political decay.
As you have noted, while China focuses on the long term and plots out its future, the U.S. in particular is beset with a short-term mentality. In effect, we are no longer an “industrial democracy” in the strict sense, but a “consumer democracy” where all the feedback signals — the market, the media and politics — are short term and geared to immediate gratification. Doesn’t that give China the competitive advantage of political capacity in the times ahead?

Zbigniew Brzezinski: Obviously so.

Gardels: How can America’s short-term mentality be changed? Are the West’s political institutions up to the challenge?

Brzezinski: Yes, if we develop a more effective and longer-range response to the current crisis instead of simply wallowing in the present difficulties — which is likely to further produce the same negative effects that got us into this mess. We are so preoccupied with the current crisis and so lacking in a longer-term perspective that we have no strategic vision which would give us some sense of historical momentum (…).

Gardels: The Chinese leadership has shifted in recent years from the defensive posture of “peaceful rise” to Party theorist Zheng Bijian’s new theme of engagement: “build on a convergence of interests to create a community of interests.” Yet, China is still hesitant to assert a global leadership role, even though it is the world’s largest creditor. If we are “present at the creation” of a post-American order, what ought to be China’s strategic role and responsibilities?

Brzezinski: Zheng is refining his idea of “convergence of interests” in conversations with Henry Kissinger, myself and others. It is a process. It is a sign that the Chinese are serious in seeking a role to play without hegemonic ambitions — at the moment. Whether they seek hegemony in the future depends on whether we in the West create circumstances in which a convergence of interests becomes attainable for them, or whether accommodation with others instead of us becomes a necessity for their national interests.
Two years ago when I gave a speech in China saying that the U.S. and China should have an informal G-2 relationship, I was applauded and there was enthusiasm. Within a year or so voices emerged that said, “Wait, this is trap” to force China the share the costs of global stability on Western terms since the West itself can no longer afford to pay.
So, China has to decide which role they want to play. With status comes responsibility and obligation. I think they understand that; they just want a key voice in the new order for which they must share responsibility. For them, this is unprecedented. In the past, their realm of influence has been self-contained. Now it has expanded.