Following the relative success of the January 30, 2005 national elections in Baghdad, many Western observers looked forward optimistically to a future Iraq marked by democracy and freedom–rather than televised executions and horrific suicide bombings.  As Iraqi voters triumphantly waved their ink stained fingers before media cameras, it seemed for a moment that there was finally some light at the end of the tunnel in America’s prolonged and costly military campaign in Iraq.  The failure of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and allied Islamic militants to significantly disrupt national elections–despite endless threats to do so–was heralded in many circles as the beginning of the end of their troubling dominance over Iraq’s restive Sunni Triangle.  Yet, three months later, that optimistic attitude is fading fast in the wake of renewed suicide bombing attacks across the country, dramatically increased signs of insurgent coordination and strategic planning, and mounting evidence that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi seeks to attack his American enemies directly in their own homeland.

When the insurgency in the Sunni Triangle first began in 2003, suicide bombings were occasional and carried out by lone attackers.  Rarely was such a daring attack recorded on film.  Over the past six months, suicide car bombings have become a disturbingly common event in central Iraq.  Nowadays, Zarqawi’s "martyrdom" volunteers aggressively prowl the streets of Iraq in dump trucks, fire engines, and even police cars laden with tons (literally) of makeshift explosives.  Rather than striking at targets of opportunity, the suicide bombers are often used to kickoff coordinated attacks on major targets, as seen in recent Al-Qaida operations on the Al-Sadeer Hotel in Baghdad, Abu Ghraib prison west of Baghdad, Camp Gannon in far western Iraq, a U.S. intelligence base in Tikrit, and (most recently) the "Battles of Omar Hadeed and Mohammed Jassem al-Issawi".  Many of these attacks are recorded and subsequently distributed by Zarqawi’s Media Wing; some of them are filmed from several different angles and at close enough range for the cameraman to be knocked down by the resulting blast.

Who are these men and why are they so eager to die?  The suicide bombers include a mix of some local Iraqi nationals (particularly those recruited by the Ansar al-Sunnah Army in northeastern Kurdish regions) and, also, a large number of foreign nationals who have volunteered to serve Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  On approximately March 27, 2005, Saleh bin Mohammed al-Fuhaid (a.k.a. Suraqah al-Tabuki from Saudi Arabia)–who was trained at Al-Qaida’s al-Farooq camp in Afghanistan and fought U.S. troops near Kabul and Kandahar in 2001–was reported killed during "fierce battles with the American forces" in central Iraq.  On April 11, Hadi bin Mubarak al-Qahtani (from Saudi Arabia) carried out a suicide bomb attack in Al-Qaim as part of the previously mentioned coordinated Al-Qaida assault on Camp Gannon.  Also on April 11, "Abu al-Walid al-Djazairi" (from Algeria)–a member of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s "martyrs" brigade–blew himself up in a kamikaze attack on a U.S. military patrol that included two armored vehicles.  On April 18, Zarqawi’s Al-Qaida faction distributed a video recording purportedly showing a devastating suicide car bombing attack carried out by "Abu Shaheed al-Lubnani" (from Lebanon).  At least two other Saudi Arabian nationals have been cited as "martyred" during insurgent operations in Iraq since April 16 alone.  There are few tallies of precisely how many foreign fighters have joined the insurgency in Iraq since 2003, but the estimated number may now exceed 10,000.

Needless to say, it is difficult to imagine Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or anyone else (Iraqi or non-Iraqi) actually succeeding in establishing a revolutionary Salafist regime in Iraq along the lines of Mullah Omar and the Taliban.  There also seems little doubt that the ability of insurgents to move within Iraq or across the Syrian border has been significantly curtailed since the heydays of "steadfast Fallujah" last summer and fall.  Moreover, Zarqawi has suffered near catastrophic blows to his inner circle of advisors just in the past year alone.  An impressive collection of adept Al-Qaida commanders in Iraq such as native Fallujan Omar Hadeed and Jordanian cleric Abu Anas al-Shami were crushed under the weight of a powerful American armed onslaught.  The words of Al-Qaida operative Abu Asim al-Yemeni al-Qusaymi come to mind, when he complained in a purported letter addressed to Zarqawi: "the morale has weakened and lines of the mujahideen have become separated due to the actions of some commanders… We have commanders that are not capable of being good leaders."

Unfortunately for America, these are all secondary points of discussion.  Even if Zarqawi’s vision for "the black of al-Tawheed fluttering in the sky over Mesopotamia" is a longshot at best, his ongoing anti-Western jihad remains a major international security risk for the United States and its coalition allies.  As thousands of budding, would-be terrorists are drawn to the conflict in Iraq like flies, the Sunni Triangle has become an virtual engine driving religious terrorism and a breeding ground for the next 9/11.  In previous decades, Al-Qaida has relied on Muslim brushfire wars in places like Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya as its very lifeblood to recruit and train an army of skilled social misfits.  While many of these men are quickly "martyred" in local combat operations (as has undoubtedly occurred frequently in Iraq), the survivors develop advanced combat experience in an urban environment.  They learn in detail the arts of sabotage, assassinations, suicide bombings, and downing commercial aircraft with missiles.  Eventually, the local conflict comes to an inexorable end, and the majority of the foreign mujahideen are forced to exfiltrate the area and return to their countries of origin–Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Kuwait, and even France and Italy.   But rather than becoming demilitarized, these battle-hardened fighters inevitably continue to carry on their terrorist activities at home, albeit in a new environment.  This is the same rough biographical sketch lurking behind dozens of the most infamous contemporary terrorist cells in the world, from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing to more recent Al-Qaida attacks in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Turkey.

The U.S. government must remain vigilant not to allow history to repeat itself in this regard.  While Iraq’s porous borders may have allowed the entry of thousands of foreign militants, the American military must ensure that these would-be terrorists face a much more arduous journey if they try to escape.  The successful exfiltration of even just a few hundred of Zarqawi’s operatives from Iraq to a neighboring country like Jordan, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia could result in a major wave of terrorism that would dwarf any comparisons to the 2003 Istanbul bombings or even 3/11 in Madrid.  Simply put, while driving a firetruck packed with explosives into a heavily armored U.S. Marine base in Iraq may have proven to be a creative but fairly ineffective measure–by contrast–mirroring the same tactic against "soft targets" in urban areas of London, Paris, Rome, New York, or Washington D.C. would have an undeniably devastating impact.