By Michael B. Kraft
Should Lebanon be a candidate for being placed on the U.S. government’s list of countries that’s support international terrorism? Is Congress getting an accurate description of how individual countries are dealing with the terrorist threat? These and other issues have been overlooked in the controversy over whether the U.S. Government’s annual reports on international terrorism accurately reflect the number of terrorist attacks and whether numbers are being tilted one way or another for political purposes.
The controversy is continuing with a House of Representatives International Relations Committee hearing this Thursday, following various commentaries and State Department and National Counterterrorism Center explanations. These followed Larry Johnson’s breaking of the story on this blog site that the 2004 terrorist attack numbers tripled those of the previous year. The NCTC report listed 651 attacks listed. The methodology had changed since previous years and there are other issues in dispute. But there is more to the annual reports than numbers.
By way of offering a little historic perspective, the controversy that emerged publicly last year over whether the State Department’s annual report to Congress provides an accurate picture of terrorism is not exactly new. The numbers controversy — and I am not attempting to downplay it–has obscured the original intention of the Congressional report.
When an annual terrorism report to Congress was proposed in 1987 by staff members of the House of Representatives International Relations Committee, their stated intent was to have a handy unclassified document that could be taken off the shelf for quick reference. As Hillel Weinberg, the committee staffer who initially proposed the annual report put it, members and staff should have an unclassified reference book they could look at before going into meetings with foreign officials or use in Congressional activities. They were interested in descriptions of terrorist groups, state sponsors of terrorism and how other countries were dealing with terrorism threat. (I was handling legislative issues for the State Department Counterterrorism Office and had to be the bearer of bad news to the Department that Congress wanted still another report.)
Previously the State Department’s Office of Counterterrorism (S/CT) had
worked with the Central Intelligence Agency since 1982 in putting out an annual Patterns of Global Terrorism Report but it was not Congressionally mandated and focused more on descriptions and tabulations of events. (The CIA operated the statistical data base for the U.S. Government –a function that was turned over last year to what is now called the National Counterterrorism Center.) Weinberg mentioned he had something in mind like the annual Human Rights Report, but the State Department officials I worked with preferred the more magazine-style format with charts and photos that had been used in the past. So, in consultation with the House staff, the concepts were merged into one document, which incorporated the legislative requirements and used glossy photos and charts. The annual “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report continued basically the same until this year when the statistical material and chronologies were published separately by the new National Counterterrorism Center.
The definition of international terrorism used in the Congressionally-mandated State Department report goes back to original reports that predated the Congressional requirement and was included in the legislation mandating the Patterns report. (Terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” The term international terrorism “means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.”)
From time to time over the years there were casual discussions within the Counterterrorism office and other offices, with Congressional staffers and visiting think tank specialists about the way the statistics were compiled and sometimes over-interpreted. With all due respect to the press (having once worked for wire services) it is often easier to write a lead on the annual report story by focusing on the number of attacks, writing that attacks were up (or down) depending on the tally.
However the numbers were not often meaningful. An attack in the middle of the night on a pipe line or electric power line tower in Colombia counted as one incident, as did an airline hijacking or an attack that caused large numbers of deaths or wounded. A major attack in a market place in, say Sri Lanka or Israel, might have an important political impact on peace efforts but would not necessarily show up in the statistics if the attacks did not hit citizens of other countries. Furthermore, during the height of the terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria and Egypt, the US bean counters were reluctant to spend too much time and effort in tallying those attacks because most of them were not international, occurred in small villages up-country, and it was difficult to get reliable information.
The Attacks That Weren’t
Furthermore, the number of attacks that actually took place did not necessarily reflect the actual level of terrorist activity or threat. Attacks may have been thwarted, or the terrorists dropped their plans for one reason or another. Each year there are numerous vague reports of possible terrorist attacks. Occasionally there are even specific threats. Precautions of one type or another would be taken and, then, no attack occurred. It was not always easy to tell if the original intelligence reports were wrong, decoys, or fabricated by “sources” trying to pretend they knew something, or, the threats were real and the terrorists backed away when they saw that the guard was up. Or, as the introduction to the NCTC center report this year said: “Non-attack or near-miss incidents were not included because of the inherent difficulty in making hypothetical damage assessments.”
The occasional discussions about these problems did not appear to lead anywhere. Other issues came up and before we knew it, a new “Patterns” report was into production along the same lines as in the past. Finally, last year, the numbers issue came to a head when the initial report indicated a drop in terrorist activities and was highlighted by the State Department during the roll-out of the report. Then, a pair of Stanford university professors wrote an op-ed pointing out that some figures were missing, and terrorism had actually gone up, touching off charges by a Congressional Democrat that the State Department was playing politics with the numbers. It turned out that in the transfer of the data base and processing of the statistics from the CIA to the Department of Homeland Security, the data was dropped out for the last six weeks of 2003 and this was overlooked by those involved in assembling the report.
This year, the State Department decided that its report would focus on the original Congressional requirements, such as what other countries were doing to fight terrorism, state sponsors, and terrorist organizations. The figures and chronology were published separately by the National Counterterrorism Center. While this may be administratively convenient, it is not so convenient for the customers, Congress and the general public. Printed copies scarce when the documents were released on April 27 and interested readers had to hunt for two different web sites to find the pair of documents.
Two Countries as Examples
More important, there is an increased danger that the reporting of information and various developments could fall between the stools. For example the chronology in the NCTC report for April 8 (page 17) reports that unknown assailants kidnapped three Japanese civilians, threatened them with guns and knives and said they would burn them if Japan did not withdraw its 550 troops within three days. The chronology goes on to say that the three civilians were released on April 15 but does not mention whether Japan decided to withdraw its troops. The State Department Country report on Japan says “Japan continued its strong counterterrorism stance, both domestically and abroad” but does not even mention the kidnappings in Iraq or Japan’s response. (Japan did not pull out its troops following the release but according to recent Japanese press reports, Tokyo plans to withdraw its 550 non-combatant contingent in December when the UN mandate expires.)
The Philippines is another example of less than complete reporting and lack of close coordination or reading of the reports in the draft stage. The NCTC chronology reports that on July 22 a Philippine truck driver kidnapped in Iraq was released after Philippine President Gloria Arroya agreed to pull out her country’s small contingent. But this capitulation to terrorists –counter to long-standing policy of the U.S. and some other nations such as Australia — was not mentioned in the State Department Country report which starts off by saying “the Philippines continues to cooperate on a range of bilateral and counterterrorism efforts” (p. 38.). The State Department report however does say that that the Philippines suffered its worst terrorist attack in history when a bomb planted by the Abu Sayyaf Group sunk SuperFerrry 14 in Manila Bay, killing about 130 passengers, although it does not provide the date (Feb 27). Yet the chronology prepared by NCTC does not even cover the incident except to say in its forward that “many significant terrorist attacks in 2004, such as the bombing of the Superferry in the Philippines and one of the two airliners downed in Russia, have been excluded from Patterns 2004 (they got the new name of the report wrong) because they did not meet the international definition” in the statute requiring the annual State Department report.
Thus, by the lights of these and perhaps other individual country reports, the State Department Country Reports and the NCTC Chronology fall short of the original Congressional intention to have a handy and accurate reference work. Overall, however the individual country reports the country reports are more detailed than in the past, some running a page or more vary in length. The quality and length vary, as to be expected, because the main texts are originally drafted by each embassy and the degree of activity and quality of reporting varies from country to country. Too many reports start out by saying country X “Continues to cooperate…” or Country Y “continues to be a strong partner….”
Lebanon
One exception is Lebanon. The State Department Country Report on that Middle East country bluntly starts off: “Lebanon remains host to numerous U.S.-designated terrorist groups” The Lebanon section (page 65) noted that Beirut “continued to demonstrate an unwillingness“ to take steps against fundamentalist terrorist groups, such as HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad. PIJ and Hizballah, as well the old-line secular Palestinian groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command. The report goes on to note that the Lebanese Government excludes Hizballah from money laundering and terrorism financing laws and has not taken action against the Lebanese involved in the hijacking of TWA 847 in 1985 and the murder of a U.S. Navy diver, and the kidnapping and murder of many Americans in the 1980’s, and others accused of murdering Americans.
These actions, or inactions, can be grounds for the Secretary of State to designate that country on the terrorism list. The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-222) that codified the terrorism list did not spell out specific criteria for the Secretary’s designation because key House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee members agreed to allow the Secretary of State wide discretion. They did not want to write into law a list of criteria that might overlook future forms of terrorism support. Instead, both committees adopted nearly identical interpretative report language to accompany the bill they sent to the floor. The report language listed a number of illustrative criteria, such as providing sanctuary from prosecution, safe houses and headquarters, direct or indirect financial backing or “other assistance for terrorist activities. (House Report No. 101-296.)
The State Department’s 2004 report notes that Lebanese security forces were “unable or unwilling” to deploy forces in the Bekka Valley that had been controlled by Syrian forces and provided a haven for Hizballah and other terrorist groups.
Now that Syria has withdrawn its troops from Lebanon, the Lebanese government no longer has the excuse of Syrian presence for avoiding efforts to control the Bekka Valley.
When Syria dominated Lebanon and controlled the Bekka, one of the explanations for not adding Lebanon to the terrorist list was that the country was really controlled by Syria. Damascus has been on the terrorism list since 1979. That explanation carries less weight now that the Syrian army has withdrawn.
About 10 years ago, the State Department had publicly cautioned Pakistan and Sudan that they were under special scrutiny for possible placement on the terrorism list. Pakistan satisfied the Department that it had stepped back from supporting terrorist activities in the Kashmir dispute with India, but Sudan did not and was ultimately placed on the list. It is currently seeking to get removed.
The State Department usually starts preparations for next year’s report with an annual internal review in the autumn of whether there are countries that should be looked at closely for possibly adding or subtracting from the terrorism list. Lebanon –judging by the information in the just-released report—should be examined very carefully. It is very close to the line and at least should be put on notice.
Three other comments on these annual reports:
• The State Department report also includes some useful sidebars or supplemental inserts, such as those on initiatives in Africa and Asia and the State Department’s Antiterrorism Training Assistance (ATA) program to bolster the capabilities of other countries but has repeatedly suffered budget cuts by OMB and Congress. These sidebars are useful and should be continued even if not required by law.
• Unlike recent years, the State Department Report (nor the new) NCTC chronologies list the names of American citizens killed in terrorist attacks, although the chronologies in some cases listed the name of the contractors employing the civilians killed in Iraq. To be more useful to members of Congress and meaningful to the public, the names and home towns of the Americans killed by terrorists should be listed in the State Department report. The report notes that nearly 60 non-combatant Americans died in terrorist attacks in Iraq during 2004. The names and hometowns of American military men are made public and honored. The civilians who lost their lives as part of the conflict in Iraq also deserve to be remembered.
• And finally, on the nuts and bolts, if Congress wants as full a report as possible, the State Department and NTC need adequate manpower resources. The number of persons assigned to the report was increased after the embarrassing problems last year. But to do it right, the officers working on the report must be able to concentrate on it and have adequate help, not be forced to try to deal with the complex report while also fielding day-to-day tasks, as happened in the past. The report is too important to be part of the multi-tasking atmosphere.
The writer is a former senior advisor in the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.