dall’Asia Times 10 maggio 2005
Al-Qaeda’s gloves are off in Pakistan
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI – A more than six-month truce between the military government of Pakistan and al-Qaeda – negotiated by militant groups – has been shattered with the arrest of Abu Faraj al-Libbi of al-Qaeda and country-wide crackdowns on militant groups.
Following Abu Faraj’s apprehension last week in connection with two assassination attempts against Musharraf in 2003, the government placed the country on high security alert. Generally, such alerts remain in place for three to four days, but it is still in place, and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future as military and security installations, important personalities and airports are considered at risk.
Asia Times Online has learned that Musharraf’s administration secretly secured a deal with al-Qaeda after a series of attacks from the tribal belt of North West Frontier Province to the southern port city of Karachi rattled the country last year. Al-Qaeda has also openly called for the overthrow of Musharraf.
The government had launched an unpopular intensive military operation in South Waziristan to root out al-Qaeda and foreign operators, resulting in the death of several hundred soldiers – the operation was bitterly opposed by local tribespeople. The initiative also resulted in a strong backlash within the army.
Last year’s unrest included an attack on the Corps Commander Peshawar’s residence, assaults on military convoys in cities such as Dera Ismail Khan and at Bannu airport, an attack on the Military Intelligence office in Kohat, one on the Corps Commander Karachi’s motorcade, in addition to a suicide attempt against Shaukat Aziz when he was announced as a candidate for prime minister.
Realizing the strength of the jihadis, moves were initiated for a truce with them, most of whom were considered sympathizers of al-Qaeda, if not linked.
Former military dictator General Zia ul-Haq’s son, Ejazul Haq, who is the federal minister for Religious Affairs and was inducted into the government purely for public relations reasons with the religious segment of the country, was assigned to secure a deal.
At the time, the influential prayer leaders of Islamabad’s famous Lal Masjid (mosque), Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, were in hiding as the government had charged them with al-Qaeda connections and even implicated them in the conspiracies to kill Musharraf. Ejazul Haq got in touch with them. Maulana Abdul Aziz’s father, the slain Maulana Abdullah, had been very close to Zia and his family. Therefore, on the guarantees given by Ejazul Haq, a deal was formulated under which all cases against the two clerics were withdrawn, and they were allowed to take over their mosques and madrassas (seminaries) in Islamabad.
In return, the clerics used their clout among Pakistani militants to get them to stop their attacks on government functionaries and national interests. Earlier, Pakistan intelligence had learned that intelligence offices and Governor’s Houses in all four provinces, beside military convoys, were among potential targets.
The deal worked: the militants halted their actions and focused their attention on Afghanistan, where the Taliban had revived their activities in all zeal. Now the deal is in tatters.
In the past 10 years, an estimated 600,000 people are believed to have been involved with jihadi groups in the country, but most of them disassociated themselves from these organizations after September 11, 2001, due to government pressures or other reasons. Now, only 50,000 are believed to be active members of militant organizations.
Although jihadi organizations were the brainchild of the Inter-Services Intelligence, in the post-September 11 environment, in which Musharraf abandoned the Taliban and signed onto the US’s "war on terror", there is widespread disgruntlement against the government of Pakistan.
Various differences, which mostly revolve around squabbles over jihadi leadership, and funds, kept the militant organizations split and reduced their level of operations. However, what is emerging now is that al-Qaeda is providing leadership direction, and further, Taliban leader Mullah Omar is working to heal differences.
A possible strategy
Intelligence quarters have come up with some Pakistani militant cells believed to be plotting unrest. Names associated with these cells include Asif Zardari, the husband of the chairperson of the opposition Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Benazir Bhutto, and Jamaat-i-Islami chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed. The Jamaat-i-Islami is Pakistan’s most prominent Islamic party and part of a conservative six-party opposition coalition, the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), that gained an unprecedented number of seats in the last elections.
The strategy would be to create chaos in the country by the Jamaat-i-Islami and the PPP turning violent against the government, thus paving the way to oust Musharraf.
Intelligence sources also fear that Musharraf could be the target of another assassination attempt.
The government has done its best to placate the MMA, but it is still obsessed with removing Musharraf through a mass mobilization campaign. A government deal with Bhutto’s PPP went sour, so the PPP is still in line to launch a campaign against Musharraf.
There is also vast disgruntlement within the ruling coalition – local elections have been delayed due to a rift within the ruling parties. In such political unrest, any terror activity would add fuel to the fire.
Syed Saleem Shahzad