Studi Strategici ed Intelligence… for dummies

Come contenere un Iran dotato di armi nucleari

mag
14


Ogni tanto i think tank americani realizzano analisi che, prendendo spunto da un eventuale fallimento degli sforzi di prevenzione, si concentrano sulle strategie volte a contenere un Iran dotato di armamento nucleare. In altre parole: cosa fare per limitare i danni qualora Teheran raggiunga la famosa “soglia”?

L’ultima di queste analisi è contenuta nel report appena pubblicato dal CNAS di Washington, terzo di una serie di studi sulle implicazioni di un Iran nucleare. Il titolo è: “If All Else Fails: The Challenges of Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran“.

14 maggio 2013 - 1:36 pm | by | 7 Comments »
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Sui limitati effetti di Stuxnet

mag
13


Il RUSI Journal ha pubblicato nell’ultimo numero un articolo di Ivanka Barzashka nel quale l’autrice, ricercatrice del Centre for Science and Security Studies del King’s College, sintetizza un’analisi da lei compiuta sulla reale efficacia del sabotaggio ai danni dell’infrastruttura nucleare iraniana realizzato tramite il worm Stuxnet.
La Barzashka, che per il suo studio si è avvalsa di dati di pubblico dominio, ritiene che il worm abbia prodotto effetti molto ridotti (se non, addirittura, controproducenti) e che, quindi, sia stato ampiamente sopravvalutato dalla stampa internazionale.
Una posizione molto interessante perchè, qualora fosse confermata, motiverebbe, forse, un certo ripensamento sulle attuali potenzialità delle c.d. “cyber-weapon“.
Scrive la ricercatrice:

[...] IAEA data does not prove that Stuxnet infected Natanz, but neither does it rule out that possibility. Analysis of trends in centrifuge numbers shows a correlation between an unexplained drop in machines and the first Stuxnet attack in 2009, but not consecutive attacks – contrary to reports that the malware was wrecking Iranian machines in 2010. If sabotage did occur, it was short-lived and most likely happened between May and November 2009. The situation appears to have been under control by 2010. More significantly, Iran’s ability to successfully operate new machines was not hindered. Stuxnet’s effects have not simply ‘worn off’, as media have widely reported. The malware did not set back Iran’s enrichment programme, though perhaps it might have temporarily slowed down Iran’s rate of expansion. Most importantly, Stuxnet or no Stuxnet, ceteris paribus, Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity increased and, consequently,so did its nuclear-weapons potential. [...]

13 maggio 2013 - 9:00 am | by | 7 Comments »
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Armamenti statunitensi verso il Medio-Oriente

apr
21


Dalla Reuters:

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said on Sunday a $10 billion arms deal under discussion with Washington’s Arab and Israeli allies sent a “very clear signal” to Tehran the military option remains on the table over its nuclear program.
“The bottom line is that Iran is a threat, a real threat,” said Hagel, who arrived in Israel on Sunday on his first visit to Israel as defense secretary.

“The Iranians must be prevented from developing that capacity to build a nuclear weapon and deliver it,” he told reporters on his plane.
The first stop on Hagel’s week-long Middle East trip came two days after the Pentagon said it was finalizing a weapons deal to strengthen the militaries of Israel and two of Iran’s key rivals – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The deal includes the sale of KC-135 aerial refueling tankers, anti-air defense missiles and tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey troop transport planes to Israel as well as the sale of 25 F-16 Fighting Falcon jets to the UAE.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia also would be allowed to purchase weapons with so-called “stand-off” capabilities that enable them to engage the enemy with precision at a distance. Defense officials said the “stand-off” arms would give the two countries more sophisticated systems than they currently have.
Asked if the arms deal sent a message that the military option was on the table if Tehran moved to build a nuclear weapon, Hagel said: “I don’t think there’s any question that that’s another very clear signal to Iran.”
But he added the military option had been “very clear to Iran for some time” and said the arms deal was a continuation of the U.S. policy to maintain Israel’s so-called “qualitative military edge” in the region, a general reference to the supply of advanced U.S.-made weaponry and technology to the Jewish state. (…)
 

21 aprile 2013 - 2:30 pm | by | 1 Comment »
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Le Corea del Nord e le difficoltà dell’intelligence di contro-proliferazione

apr
14


Ne avevamo già parlato lo scorso anno in relazione all’Iran (qui e qui) e prima ancora riguardo al fallimento iraqeno. Le attuali divergenze analitiche all’interno della comunità dei Servizi statunitensi non fanno che confermare l’estrema difficoltà nella raccolta e nell’elaborazione di informazioni nel campo della proliferazione nucleare con tutto ciò che ne consegue in termini di processo decisionale politico-strategico (si veda qui, qui e qui)

14 aprile 2013 - 12:23 pm | by | 6 Comments »
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Sulla reazione saudita al nucleare iraniano

feb
20


Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton e Matthew Irvine, del Center for a New American Security, hanno condotto una ricerca sulle potenziali conseguenze di un Iran dotato di armamento nucleare. Nel report, dal titolo “Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?“, gli autori sostengono l’improbabilità che l’Arabia Saudita, in risposta ad un Iran nucleare, arrivi a dotarsi anch’essa di armamento nucleare:

The Saudis would be highly motivated to acquire some form of nuclear deterrent to counter an Iranian bomb.
However, significant disincentives – including the prospect of worsening Saudi Arabia’s security environment, rupturing strategic ties with the United States, damaging the country’s international reputation and making the Kingdom the target of sanctions – would discourage a mad rush by Riyadh to develop nuclear weapons. And, in any case, Saudi Arabia lacks the technological and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so any time in the foreseeable future. Saudi Arabia is more likely to respond to Iranian nuclearization by continuing to bolster its conventional defenses against Iranian aggression while engaging in a long-term hedging strategy designed to improve civilian nuclear capabilities.

20 febbraio 2013 - 2:54 pm | by | 2 Comments »
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Scenari per il 2013 (e non solo) – settima parte

gen
06


Speravate che mi fossi dimenticato di voi? Ed invece no! Qui e qui due analisi per il 2013 ed oltre di Alessandro Fugnoli, strategist del Fondo Kairos.
Fugnoli realizza una rubrica settimanale di strategia, “Il rosso ed i nero”, che, a mio avviso, offre sempre spunti piuttosto interessante.

6 gennaio 2013 - 12:30 pm | by | No Comments »
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