Studi Strategici ed Intelligence… for dummies

Dal Medio-Oriente al Pacifico

giu
12


Gli ultimi lavori di due think-tank americani, il CNAS e lo Strategic Studies Institute, ci conducono in un viaggio dalla Penisola araba al Sud-est asiatico: “The Future of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the Age of Uncertainties” e “The Emerging Asia Power Web: the Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties“.
Ma il documento più interessante è senza dubbio: “Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Assessment“, un’analisi geostrategica e geopolitica della regione Asia-Pacifico realizzata dal punto di vista dello U.S. Army War College.

Asia-Pacific – A Strategic Assessment by Silendo

12 giugno 2013 - 9:46 am | by | No Comments »
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“La Cina non è una Superpotenza!”

giu
08


Come quasi sempre accade mi trovo d’accordo con Fareed Zakaria* il quale, nel suo ultimo commento al Washington Post sull’incontro tra Obama e Xi Jinping, scrive:

[...] Some Americans want to see these meetings as a “G-2” alliance of sorts between the world’s largest economies. That would not serve U.S. interests nor those of broader global stability and integration.
China is the world’s second-largest economy and, because of its size, will one day become the largest. (On a per-capita basis, it is a middle-income country, and it might never surpass the United States in that regard.) But power is defined along many dimensions, and by most political, military, strategic and cultural measures, China is a great but not global power. For now, it lacks the intellectual ambition to set the global agenda.
The scholar David Shambaugh, who has always been well-disposed toward China, put it this way in a recent book: “China is, in essence, a very narrow-minded, self-interested, realist state, seeking only to maximize its own national interests and power. It cares little for global governance and enforcing global standards of behavior (except its much-vaunted doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of countries). Its economic policies are mercantilist and its diplomacy is passive. China is also a lonely strategic power, with no allies and experiencing distrust and strained relationships with much of the world.” [...]

* Si tratta di una riflessione al volo, tra un caffè ed un thè freddo…

8 giugno 2013 - 4:23 pm | by | 5 Comments »
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La Huawei e la sicurezza delle infrastrutture critiche britanniche

giu
07


Il comitato di controllo sui Servizi britannici ha presentato proprio ieri al proprio Parlamento il report finale di un’indagine sulle implicazioni per la sicurezza nazionale degli investimenti stranieri nel settore delle infrastrutture critiche: “Foreign involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure: The implications for national security“.
In modo simile a quanto fatto dal Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence americano l’Intelligence and Security Committee britannico ha esaminato il ruolo della compagnia cinese Huawei nel sistema di telecomunicazioni inglesi identificando alcune criticità, soprattutto riguardo all’insufficiente valutazione degli eventuali rischi derivanti dal coinvolgimento di società straniere in settori delicati come quelli delle infrastrutture critiche (Critical National Infrastructure o CNI). Nelle conclusioni del rapporto, infatti, scrivono i membri del comitato:

[...] It is not practicable to seek to constrain CNI companies to UK suppliers, nor would that necessarily provide full protection given the global nature of supply chains. The risk to the CNI cannot be eliminated, but Government must ensure that it is managed properly. There must be:
– an effective process by which Government is alerted to potential foreign investment in the CNI;
– an established procedure for assessing the risks;
– a process for developing a strategy to manage these risks throughout the lifetime of the contract and beyond;
– clarity as to what powers Government has or needs to have; and
– clear lines of responsibility and accountability.
When it comes to the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure, Ministers must be kept informed at all stages.
• We do not believe that these crucial requirements existed when BT and Huawei first began their commercial relationship. From the evidence we have taken during this investigation, the procedural steps that we have outlined still do not appear to exist.
However, as we went to press, we were told that the Government has now developed a process to assess the risks associated with foreign investment into the UK. Whether these processes are sufficiently robust remains to be seen: the steps we have outlined must exist to ensure that Government does not find itself in the same position again.

Foreign Involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure – The Implications for National Security by Silendo

7 giugno 2013 - 4:04 pm | by | No Comments »
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Un libro sullo spionaggio industriale cinese

giu
07


Nei giorni in cui il presidente americano ed il presidente cinese si incontrano per discutere anche di sicurezza cibernetica New York Times e Financial Times hanno pubblicato due analisi sullo spionaggio industriale cinese (qui l’interessantissimo report della Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property).
Il New York Times, in particolare, fa riferimento ad un libro da poco pubblicato: “Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernisation“, il primo nel quale venga esaminata in profondità, anche in prospettiva storica, la strategia cinese per il trasferimento clandestino di tecnologie:

[...] The authors of the new book say that technology transfer is an official policy at all levels of the Communist Party and the state. It often takes place in a legal gray area, since laws governing technology transfer can be vague or nonexistent. The authors warn that the United States and other nations need to acknowledge the extent of the Chinese campaign, which they say far exceeds those of other countries and threatens American competitiveness.
“China is in a different league altogether, exceeding the international norm not just in scale, the number and variety of transfer venues, the moral agnosticism of its practitioners, and the degree of government support,” the authors, William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon and Anna B. Puglisi, said in written answers to questions. “It’s an entire mind-set.”
China’s strategies range from setting up science parks for Chinese returnees to persuading foreign companies to open research centers in China, they said. [...]

7 giugno 2013 - 10:04 am | by | 4 Comments »
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Il bilanciamento del Pentagono verso l’Asia

giu
05


Il primo giugno, ospite dello Shangri-La Dialogue di Singapore, il ministro della Difesa Hagel ha parlato del ruolo delle forze armate americane nella strategia (?) di “ribilanciamento” verso la regione Asia-Pacifico in tempi di austerità fiscali.
In sostanza, come fece già il suo precedessore Panetta, anche Hagel ha voluto rassicurare gli Stati dell’area sulla serietà dell’impegno americano nel tenere sotto controllo la Cina, nonostante la riduzione del bilancio della difesa.

In support of this goal, America is implementing a rebalance – which is primarily a diplomatic, economic and cultural strategy. President Obama is increasing funding for diplomacy and development in Asia, including a seven percent increase in foreign assistance in the Asia-Pacific region. [...]

The Department of Defense plays an important role in securing the President’s vision of rebalance. Our approach was outlined in the President’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, which is still guiding the U.S. military as we reorient its capabilities and capacities to better prepare for future global security challenges.

As we carry out this strategy, it is true that the Department of Defense will have fewer resources than in the recent past. It would be unwise and short-sighted to conclude, however, that our commitment to the rebalance cannot be sustained – particularly given the truth that even under the most extreme budget scenarios, the United States military will continue to represent nearly 40 percent of global defense expenditures. Like the employment of all resources, it is always a matter of the wise, judicious and strategic use of those resources that matters the most and has the most lasting impact.

The fact of the matter is that new fiscal realities present an opportunity to conduct a thorough and much-needed review to ensure we are matching resources to the most important priorities. With that goal in mind, I recently directed a Department-wide Strategic Choices and Management Review. Although the review’s outcome is not final, the direction I provided was to follow the President’s defense strategic guidance, to focus new energy and thinking on addressing long-standing challenges, and to make our defense enterprise one that better reflects 21st century security realities – including the rise of Asia.

For the region, this means I can assure you that coming out of this review, the United States will continue to implement the rebalance and prioritize our posture, activities and investments in Asia-Pacific. We are already taking many tangible actions in support of that commitment.

For example, the United States is adding to the capacity of our ground forces in the Pacific after Iraq and as we draw down from Afghanistan. The 1st and 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force and the Army’s 25th Infantry Division are all returning to their home stations in the Pacific theater. The United States Army is also designating 1st Corps as “regionally aligned” to the Asia-Pacific region.

In addition to our decision to forward base 60 percent of our naval assets in the Pacific by 2020, the U.S. Air Force has allocated 60 percent of its overseas-based forces to the Asia-Pacific – including tactical aircraft and bomber forces from the continental United States. The Air Force is focusing a similar percentage of its space and cyber capabilities on the region. These assets enable us to capitalize on the Air Force’s inherent speed, range, and flexibility.

The United States military is not only shifting more of its assets to the Pacific – we are using these assets in new ways to enhance our posture and partnerships. For example, we are pushing forward with plans for innovative rotational deployments in the region. Last year, we noted at this forum that the U.S. Navy had committed to rotating up to four Littoral Combat Ships through Singapore. In recent weeks, the first of those ships, the USS Freedom, arrived to begin a busy schedule of regional maritime engagements. I look forward to visiting the ship tomorrow. Meanwhile, the second company-sized rotation of U.S. Marines recently arrived in Darwin to deepen cooperation with our treaty ally Australia and other regional partners. Eventually, 2,500 U.S. Marines will be deployed to Australia each year.

America’s enduring commitment to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region depends on sustaining the ability to deter aggression and operate effectively across all domains, including air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace.

Our five year budget plan submitted to Congress this year put a premium on rapidly deployable, self-sustaining forces – such as submarines, long-range bombers, and carrier strike groups – that can project power over great distance and carry out a variety of missions. In the future, this region will see more of these capabilities as we prioritize deployments of our most advanced platforms to the Pacific, including the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter deployments to Japan, and a fourth Virginia-class fast attack submarine forward deployed to Guam.

Even further over the horizon, we are investing in promising technologies and capabilities that will enhance our decisive military edge well into the future. For example, last month, for the first time ever, the U.S. Navy successfully launched an experimental remotely piloted aircraft from an aircraft carrier, ushering in a new era in naval aviation.

Having achieved a series of technological breakthroughs in directed energy, next year for the first time the U.S. Navy will deploy a solid-state laser aboard a ship, the USS Ponce. This capability provides an affordable answer to the costly problem of defending against asymmetric threats like missiles, swarming small boats, and remotely piloted aircraft.

Combined with new concepts, doctrine, and plans that integrate these new technologies and other game changing capabilities, we will ensure freedom of action throughout the region well into the future.

Our investments in Asia are not just about cutting-edge technology and platforms, they are also about cultivating deeper ties between our people and building a network of professional military personnel and security experts across the region. [...]

Per chi volesse approfondire qui di seguito il video integrale.

5 giugno 2013 - 2:32 pm | by | No Comments »
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L’operazione NetTraveler

giu
05


La società Kaspersky ha annunciato due giorni fa di aver scoperto un’attività di cyber-espionage internazionale condotta tra il 2005 ed il 2013 tramite un malware denominato NetTraveler. I soggetti colpiti sono stati circa 350 in 40 Paesi (non risulta l’Italia), in gran parte asiatici. In gran parte governi (19%) e strutture diplomatiche (32%) ma anche forze armate, sistemi industriali ed infrastrutturali, università e centri di ricerca.

L’operazione, secondo Kaspersky, sarebbe stata eseguita da un gruppo denominato “Red Star” composto da una cinquantina di soggetti di lingua cinese: qui il report.

5 giugno 2013 - 1:27 pm | by | No Comments »
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Sul minacciare il ricorso ad attacchi cyber

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16


Conscio che al nostro Giovanni non farà piacere segnalo comunque una riflessione di Martin Libicki pubblicata dalla RAND Corporation e riguardante le capacità di deterrenza del cyberspazio: “Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities“.
Lo studio è stato finanziato dal Dipartimento della Difesa statunitense e direi che ben si confà alle recenti vicende di Stuxnet e, soprattutto,  alla “fuga” di notizie volta ad individuare negli Stati Uniti i responsabili del cyber-attacco alle infrastrutture nucleari iraniane. Scrive Libicki nelle conclusioni:

Brandishing a cyber capability would do three things: declare a capability, suggest the possibility of its use in a particular circumstance, and indicate that such use would really hurt. In the era of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff, the suggestion of use was the most relevant. Possession was obvious, and its consequences were well understood. The same does not hold true for cyberweapons. Possession is likely not obvious, and the ability to inflict serious harm is debatable. Even if demonstrated, what worked yesterday may not work today. But difficult does not mean impossible.
Advertising cyberwar capabilities may be helpful. It may back up a deterrence strategy.
It might dissuade other states from conventional mischief or even from investing in mischiefmaking capabilities. It may reduce the other side’s confidence in the reliability of its information, command-and-control, or weapon systems. In a nuclear confrontation, it may help build the edge that persuades other states that the brandisher will stay the course, thereby persuading the other states to yield. Yet proving such capability is not easy, even if it exists. Cyber capabilities exist only in relationship to a specific target, which must be scoped to be understood. Cyber warriors can illustrate their ability to penetrate systems, but penetration is not the same as getting them to fail in useful ways. Since cyberattacks are essentially single-use weapons, they are diminished in the showing. It can be hard to persuade your friends that you have such capabilities when skepticism is in their interest. [...]
Conversely, the gains from brandishing such capabilities depend on the context and can be problematic even then. There is both promise and risk in cyber brandishing, in both the conventional and nuclear cases. It would not hurt to give serious thought to ways in which the United States can enhance its ability to leverage what others believe are national capabilities. Stuxnet has certainly convinced many others that the United States can do many sophisticated things in cyberspace (regardless of what, if anything, the United States actually contributed to Stuxnet). This effort will take considerable analysis and imagination, inasmuch as none of the various options presented here are obvious winners. That said, brandishing is an option that may also not work. It is no panacea, and it is unlikely to make a deterrence posture succeed if the other elements of deterrence (e.g., the will to wage war or, for red lines drawn in cyberspace, the ability to attribute) are weak.

16 maggio 2013 - 11:07 pm | by | 2 Comments »
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Il nuovo numero di The Washington Quarterly

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13


Cari ragazzi, è online il numero primaverile della rivista quadrimestrale del CSIS di Washington. Tra i saggi segnalo quello di Ely Ratner sul pivot… pardòn… sul “ribilanciamento” statunitense verso l’Asia e quello di Colin H. Kahl e Marc Lynch sulle strategie americane verso il Medio-Oriente.

13 maggio 2013 - 7:34 pm | by | No Comments »
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Il Pentagono e la strategia cinese

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07


La legge americana prevede che ogni anno il Pentagono prepari, per il Congresso, un report di analisi sugli sviluppi militari e di sicurezza della Cina.
Ieri è stato presentato il rapporto 2013 che, a parere del sottoscritto, risulta particolarmente interessante. Non tanto per le valutazioni riguardanti la cyber-defense o il cyber-warfare che dir si voglia, peraltro subito evidenziati dalla stampa statunitense. Infatti, che le dinamiche di cyber-security tra Stati Uniti e Cina fossero dinamiche connesse soprattutto alla “preparazione del campo di battaglia” in vista di un futuro conflitto militare era cosa abbastanza chiara già da una decina d’anni. Per lo meno a chi, nell’analizzare  gli aspetti cyber, non si limita ad un approccio tattico ed “ingegneristico”….
No, il documento di quest’anno è particolarmente interessante proprio per le valutazioni di carattere strategico, quelle riguardanti, cioè, obiettivi e strumenti della strategia di medio-lungo termine cinese.

 

Report to Congress – Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 201…

7 maggio 2013 - 10:16 am | by | 2 Comments »
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La Cina e lo spionaggio ai danni dei Think Tank – II

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04


Anche l’Intelligence di Taiwan, il National Security Bureau, conferma l’interesse cinese nei confronti delle organizzazioni accademiche e di ricerca.
Secondo quanto affermato in un recente report al Parlamento l’apparato di cyber-spionaggio cinese conterebbe oltre 100.000 uomini con un budget di circa 2,7 milioni di dollari.
Il focus delle attività spionaggio, inoltre, si sarebbe progressivamente spostato dai siti governativi e militari verso bersagli civili, in particolare think tanks e infrastrutture di telecomunicazione.
Ovviamente la Cina non concorda e rigetta le accuse.

4 maggio 2013 - 1:54 pm | by | No Comments »
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