Nel post precedente si parlava della necessità di una grand strategy per l’Italia. Quello che segue non è proprio una “grand strategy” ma di sicuro è un interessante documento di strategia geo-economica appena realizzato dal Governo australiano: “Australia in the Asian Century“.
Il numero di giugno 2012 della rivista del Combating Terrorism Center.
… secondo George Friedman della Stratfor.
… secondo Robert Kaplan (Stratfor):
The Obama administration “pivot” to the Pacific, formally announced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last November and reiterated more recently by the president himself, might appear like a reassertion of America’s imperial tendencies just at the time when Washington should be concentrating on the domestic economy. But in fact, the pivot was almost inevitable.
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, signaling communism’s defeat in Europe, security experts talked about a shift in diplomatic and military energies to the Pacific. But Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to a decadelong preoccupation with the Middle East, with the U.S. Army leading a land war against Iraq in 1991 and the Navy and Air Force operating no-fly zones for years thereafter. Then came 9/11, and the Bush administration’s initiation of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as a response. Finally, the ending of both those conflicts is in sight, and the United States, rather than return to quasi-isolationism as it has done with deleterious effect after other ground wars in its history, is attempting to pivot its focus to the geographical heart of the global economy: the Indian and Pacific oceans.
The Indian Ocean is the world’s energy interstate, across which passes crude oil and natural gas from the Arabian Peninsula and Iranian Plateau to the burgeoning, middle-class urban sprawls of East Asia. Though we live in a jet and information age, 90 percent of all commercial goods that travel from one continent to another do so by container ship, and half of those goods in terms of global tonnage — and one-third in terms of monetary value — traverse the South China Sea, which connects the Indian Ocean with the Western Pacific. Moreover, the supposedly energy-rich South China Sea is the economic hub of world commerce, where international sea routes coalesce. And it is the U.S. Navy and Air Force, more than any other institutions, that have kept those sea lines of communication secure, thus allowing for post-Cold War globalization in the first place. This is the real public good that the United States provides the world. But now a new challenge looms for the United States: a rising China as demonstrated by the totality of its power — its geographical proximity to the South China Sea and environs; its economic heft, making it the largest trading partner of most if not all of the littoral nations (despite economic troubles in China itself); and its expanding submarine fleet. Beijing has been buying smart, investing in subs, ballistic missiles, and space and cyber warfare as part of a general defense build-up. China has no intention of going to war with the United States, but it does seek to impede in time of crisis U.S. military access to the South China Sea and the rest of maritime Asia. [...]
Were the United States not now to turn to the Indo-Pacific, it would risk a multipolar military order arising up alongside an already existent multipolar economic and political order. Multipolar military systems are more unstable than unipolar and bipolar ones because there are more points of interactions and thus more opportunities for miscalculations, as each country seeks to readjust the balance of power in its own favor. U.S. military power in the Indo-Pacific is needed not only to manage the peaceful rise of China but also to stabilize a region witnessing the growth of indigenous civil-military post-industrial complexes.
If American power was diminished, China, India and other powers would be far more aggressive toward each other than they are now, for they all benefit from the secure sea lines of communication provided by the U. S. Navy and Air Force.
Una riflessione di Peter Layton colta al volo dal blog del Lowy Institute australiano nel quale si sta discutendo, in questi giorni, del ruolo del Primo Ministro e del suo ufficio nelle politiche di sicurezza nazionale.
"The main issue is that the major lesson learned by some in the first decade of this century — and in parts of the last — was that national security was best conducted as a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation affair (…)
With the best will in the world the big departments left to themselves will treat their individual needs as their first priority, especially in times of austerity. In such an environment, departmental insularity and a fixation on preserving the status quo may well prevail. The national security policy at the highest level may then simply be the sum of the various department's desires."
Come ampiamente previsto da tempo gli Stati Uniti danno il via ad un ridispiegamento delle proprie forze verso il Pacifico meridionale.
E' notizia di ieri che dal prossimo anno i marines inizieranno a "frequentare" la base navale di Darwin, nel nord dell'Australia. Un punto strategico per la proiezione di potenza verso il Mar Cinese meridionale e per il controllo delle più importanti linee di comunicazione marittime.
E' appena il caso di evidenziare che, nell'ambito di un più generale spostamento del centro di gravità dei propri interessi di sicurezza nazionale, gli USA stanno rafforzando i legami con l'Australia al fine di adoperarla come ulteriore contrappeso alla crescita di potenza economica e militare cinese.
Scriveva il Washington Post due giorni fa:
"In the face of growing Chinese economic and military power, U.S. allies across Asia have been asking for help in counterbalancing potential threats in the disputed South China Sea and elsewhere. Australia is located close to Southeast Asia, an area of economic growth and emerging economies that the United States would like to influence as political democracies. Furthermore, analysts said, having access to military bases in Australia would allow the United States another staging area outside the range of China’s increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles. The plan is “part of a general idea about how to disperse military power away from a concentration in North Asia,” said Patrick Cronin, an Asia Pacific security analyst at the Center for a New American Security. “It’s a continuing concerted step over the past five years, when the Chinese rise has loomed larger as an issue than ever.”
Grande gioia a Pechino…
Se c'è una cosa per la quale impazziscono tutti coloro che, come il sottoscritto, studiano l'Intelligence sono i documenti come questo. Chi vuole studiare gli apparati di sicurezza nazionale si deve confrontare con una costante scarsezza di dati ed informazioni dovuta, ovviamente, alla natura riservata/segreta della gran parte delle attività svolte da questi organismi.
Tralasciando memorie, biografie, libri o articoli di inchiesta (vera o presunta), fughe di notizie (vere o presunte), le fonti principali del ricercatore sono gli atti delle commissioni d'inchiesta (parlamentari, governative o indipendenti) istituite per indagare sui fallimenti dei Servizi, atti giudiziari di procedimenti riguardanti direttamente o indirettamente funzionari dell'Intelligence, reports di commissioni di studio (parlamentari, governative o indipendenti) istituite in relazione a processi di riforma, relazioni delle commissioni parlamentari di controllo o i periodici resoconti che l'Intelligence invia agli organi di controllo.
E' a quest'ultima categoria che appartiene il documento che allego qui sotto. Si tratta infatti della versione pubblica del report annuale che l'agenzia australiana di intelligence interna prepara per il Parlamento. In base alla mia esperienza quello dell'Australian Security Intelligence Organisation è, a livello internazionale. il documento del genere più "aperto" e trasparente, abbondante proprio di quei dati che sono essenziali per poter condurre studi seri e "scientifici" sulla materia.
Vi invito, quindi, a leggerlo con attenzione. Senza dubbio resterete sorpresi dal fatto che informazioni che altrove sono considerate riservate e/o segrete qui vengono rese pubbliche.
Numero dei dipendenti dell'Agenzia, composizione della "forza lavoro", trattamenti economici, percorsi di carriera e step formativi, bilanci certificati nei minimi dettagli, obiettivi strategici, struttura dell'Agenzia e compiti dei vari uffici. Tutto questo oltre, ovviamente, a quei dati che sono presenti, secondo vari livelli di approfondimento, in tutti i resoconti del genere ovvero analisi del contesto strategico e attività svolte.
Che dire? Una pacchia…
Attenzione, però! All'interno della comunità d'intelligence australiana solo l'ASIO diffonde pubblicamente questo tipo di resconto. ASIS, DSD, DIGO ed ONA non fanno altrettanto.
Grazie alla segnalazione su The Interpreter, il bel blog del Lowy Institute for International Policy di Sidney, ho potuto leggere la trascrizione di un recentissimo discorso del National Security Adviser indiano Shivshankar Menon, uno dei 100 global thinkers secondo la rivista Foreign Policy. Oggetto dell'intervento di Menon è stato il ruolo delle forze armate nell'attuale sistema internazionale.
Ne consiglio la lettura. Si tratta di una bella lezione di "realismo".
"(…) The biggest difference between national societies and international society is that sanctions for not respecting laws within our societies are several and multilayered, ranging from social opprobrium to judicial punishment. There is no effective international equivalent of these sanctions for those who transgress international law, such as it is. The only effective sanction is force or the threat of its use, and the willingness of those who possess it to use it.
In other words, while domestic societies have evolved or are evolving towards rule of law, international society is still much closer to primeval anarchy, where to a very great extent “the strong do as they will and the weak do as they must.”
Force is today the ultimate sanction in international society, and while it may be one of several sanctions, it is clearly the most widely studied and used. Its use is not getting any less frequent despite all the attempts to develop other means of suasion and persuasion. Military power remains central to great power competition which defines the global order.
The last sixty years have seen a dramatic increase in the frequency of conflict and its intensity, between and within societies. This is a result of new technologies of force and their widespread dissemination. In fact we seem to be entering a phase of increasing militarization of international relations. Look at recent developments in the Middle East, where conventional air power, covert and Special Forces, and internet social media have been used in new tactical combinations with old fashioned propaganda and international institutions to change regimes and create political outcomes.
Secondly, as technology has developed, newer forms of power also have increasing effect. For instance today cyber actions in virtual space have kinetic effects that were once only possible through the use of traditional military force.
In other words the spectrum of conflict, and therefore of the use of force is widening. The state no longer has a monopoly of violence, and technology has empowered small groups and individuals to the point where they can pose credible threats to society, if not the state itself. We have only to think of the recent lethality of terrorist groups and their attacks. (…)"
Il Parlamento Europeo ha appena pubblicato quello che, a mio modestissimo avviso, è uno dei migliori studi esistenti sulla funzione parlamentare di controllo delle strutture di Intelligence e sicurezza.
Il documento è il risultato finale di un elaborato programma di ricerca (si veda il paragrafo sulla metodologia a pag. 40) svolto su input della Commissione Libertà civili, giustizia ed affari interni e volto ad individuare, anche in base all'esperienza nazionale dei singoli Paesi europei, le best practices in materia al fine di rafforzare il controllo parlamentare delle agenzie di intelligence e sicurezza dell'Unione Europea (Europol, Sitcen, Eurojust, Frontex).
I documenti annessi al report sono interessantissimi. Tra questi c'è anche uno studio sul nostro Copasir di Tommaso Giupponi e Federico Fabbrini.
Dopo aver vagamente descritto l’Office of National Assessments australiano ritengo utile dare una scorsa alla “Canberra lecture” che il suo direttore generale, Allan Gyngell, ha tenuto presso il Lowy Institute for International Policy. Think tank che lo stesso Allan, già diplomatico di lungo corso, ha contribuito a fondare anni fa.
Le dichiarazioni di Gyngell offrono la possibilità di comprendere meglio l’approccio australiano all’intelligence.
Ecco, qui di seguito, una sintesi dei punti che ritengo più interessanti.
Sul concetto di intelligence:
Probably the simplest definition of intelligence is that it is useful information (…) the sort of knowledge our state must possess regarding other states in order to assure itself that its cause will not suffer nor its undertakings.
Sulla comunità d’intelligence australiana:
Hope placed weight on the importance of Australia having its own indigenous intelligence capabilities. The model he developed for the Australian Intelligence Community has three distinctive features: its breadth, the centrality it accords to assessment, and strong independent oversight of the legality and propriety of its activities.
By breadth I mean two things. First, the range of the disciplines Australian agencies use to collect information – the full suite of information gleaned from human contacts, technical interception, the surveillance of things others are trying to keep secret as well as open source. And secondly the geographic and thematic spread of issues on which they collect and assess. (…) Australia’s national interests can be affected by developments in parts of the world remote from our shores and that we need to understand those developments and to be able to contribute independent Australian views to the considerations of our allies and the international community.”
The second distinctive (indeed unique) feature of the Australian model is the centrality of assessment. Hope recognised that the government needed effective assessments to filter the raw material of collection, to shape it and weigh it. He concluded that a peak assessment agency with statutory independence was required, separate from the collection functions of intelligence. (…)
Sul ruolo dell’ONA:
Assessment organisations like ONA exist so governments can hedge against the risk, present in every system at every time, that policymakers will tend to see the world in terms of the prescriptions they have already written to address its problems. (…) ONA’s mission is to deepen Australia’s capacity to act in the world in ways that serve our national interest and advance the norms and values we believe in, it does this by standing dispassionately apart from the policy process.
(…) ONA is in the business of ideas and information. Our success hinges on our ability to understand complex issues to identify, manage, analyse and communicate information effectively. ONA is at its best when bringing togheter the different expertise and insights of geographical and functional specialists
Sulla differenza tra think-tanks ed Intelligence:
(…) even with mysteries, secret intelligence can throw vital light on what might otherwise be supposition. And that matters to government, because the biggest difference between writing about the same issue in the intelligence community and in a think tank relates to the greater degree of confidence required by government. (…) So secret intelligence provides – or provides at its best – a much greater degree of confidence. It can throw light on the motivations of key players, reveal capacity, and be critically helpful to analysts in helping them sort out the facts from the reams of speculation.
Sulla “competizione” tra Mass Media ed Intelligence:
ONA and the Australian intelligence agencies have never been, and are even less now, the sole source of information about the world reaching Ministers (…) all of them have other, often more immediate, ways of learning about the world: from TV and newspapers, iPads and social media, think tanks, academic experts, the experiences of business-people and the opinion of family and friends.
The noise level is high. That’s inevitable and it’s the responsibility of the intelligence analyst to cut through all that noise by producing assessments that are so credible, accurate, policy-relevant and timely that our work stands out for our customers. To succeed in this we will need to be able to deliver our product in forms and at speeds that reflect the environment in which they are operating. That will have many challenges, including the protection of information. But intelligence that is not informing decision-making is pointless.”.
Sulle tendenze strategiche globali:
- power will be more diffuse and, as a result, it will be more important for Australia to be able to understand and work with countries outside our traditional areas of focus;
– in the combination of all the dimensions of power, the US will remain the most powerful state;
– China’s economic rise means that a growing number of issues, global as well as regional, will have a Chinese dimension;
– information will be increasingly abundant, so its sifting will become more important. At the same time, however, governments and private sector producers of content will have greater success in restricting easy access to valuable information;
– technological change will accelerate, providing new public policy challenges and creating new threats and opportunities;
– as the power relativities they reflect continue to change, global institutions will be in a state of flux;
– the global economy will operate in ways quite different from those we have known in the past, with developing countries driving growth;
– non-state actors from terrorists to cyber criminals to people smugglers will have a continuing capacity tangibly to affect state power;
– the demand for energy, water and food will all increase and the geopolitical consequences will play out around the globe.