A cinque anni dall’inizio della crisi economica Matthew Hill, dottorando alla Cornell University, in un post per il blog del Lowy Institute sintetizza le ricadute strategiche per l’aria dell’Asia-Pacifico:
[…] As the chart below suggests, the divergence in the fiscal paths of major regional states is substantially mirrored in their defence spending trajectories. Those states capable of pragmatically adjusting their budgets have also retained scope for increasing defence spending.
While the relationship between state finances and military capacity is hardly determinative, it does suggest three blunt insights into the future evolution of the strategic balance in the Asia Pacific.Firstly, while overall US military expenditure remains substantial, present trends suggest a rapid attrition of its lead. This trajectory is the font of regional scepticism regarding the implications of the Obama Administration’s much-heralded ‘pivot’ to the region. While commentators have obsessed over the impact of the Administration’s handling of Syria on US credibility, the reality is that constant congressional willingness to play chicken with the economy is vastly more damaging to Asia Pacific assessments of Washington’s capacity for strategic commitment.
Second, it is notable that Russia and China dominate the list of beneficiaries of fiscal-military dynamics, while their potential counterweights, Japan and India, look set to lag behind. This complicates the ability of the US to step back from the region towards a role as ‘offshore balancer’, since such a role implies a higher level of strategic engagement by US partners than they appear capable of.
Third, the evolution of strategic and fiscal dynamics is notable for its outliers. Two major US partners who appear to be in a fiscal position to increase their defence spending (South Korea and Australia) have so far chosen not to. With respect to the latter, the inauguration of the Abbott Government may indicate a shift towards more robust expenditure, but that is far from certain.
The behaviour of both Canberra and Seoul may reflect a tacit acceptance of the limits of their strategic potential relative to regional behemoths. If so, the scope for strategic engagement in support of regional stability may be rapidly shrinking.
Sulla rapida erosione cui andrebbero incontro gli USA non sono d’accordo.
Secondo l’annuario SIPRI (la stessa fonte dell’autore del post) gli USA che sono primi nel mondo per spese militari, hanno investito in difesa circa 4 volte la somma del secondo paese in classifica ( Cina), con 682-166 miliardi USD. La differenza in termini assoluti ( cioe misurata in soldi veri) non lascia spazio ad equivoci.
Anche la differenza nella percentuale rispetto al PIL ( 4,4-2.0, con piccole variazioni nelle tabelle) sembrerebbe non lasciare dubbi delle posizioni in campo. Se anche dovessero esserci delle variazioni importanti ad esempio nel PIL della Cina, la variazione nel rapporto denominatore/numeratore richiederebbe, afifcnhe si verifichi un rapido declino US, un aumento fortissimo in termini reali delle spese cinesi. Cio sembrerebbe incompatibile sia in linea generale, sia tenuto conto delle tendenze di politica cinese ( rapido incremento del costo della vita, mutate esigenze sullo scenario internazionale).
La Russia annuncia la creazione di 40 nuove brigate dell’esercito entro il 2020.
Russia to establish 40 more army brigades by 2020
http://www.janes.com/article/27839/russia-to-establish-40-more-army-brigades-by-2020
Russian Deputy Defence Minister Nikolai Pankov announced on 30 September that Russia plans to establish 40 new army brigades by 2020, according to an official military statement.
Pankov indicated new brigades will be raised without increasing the strength of the armed forces above their current authorisation of 1,000,000 men. The Russian ground forces currently have around 300,000 personnel.
He also hinted that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) may re-establish a couple more divisions disbanded after 2009.
The MoD press release reported that the ground forces have purchased 600 weapons systems and other equipment in 2013.
In 2014, the army plans to buy 750 major systems, including Iskander-M tactical missiles, 9A53 Tornado-G multiple rocket launchers, and Tayfun and Tigr-M armoured vehicles.