L’istituto di studi strategici dell’Esercito americano ha pubblicato uno studio di Florence Gaub sulle carenze in ambito NATO emerse in occasione dell’intervento in Libia: “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Lybia: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector“. Carenze di tipo politico-strategico, operativo, culturale, organizzativo e nella comunicazione.
Scrive nelle conclusioni l’autrice:
Albeit hailed by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridis, as a “model intervention,”59 the Alliance can still learn a number of strategic lessons from its Libyan adventure. These include, of course, technical elements such as air power and command structure, but extends to aspects such as culture, strategic communication, and the general political backdrop against which OUP was conducted. Most importantly, OUP will relaunch the Alliance’s debate on its collective stance on the Middle East. After all, it proved to be a moment of division for NATO as well as Germany, which abstained from the vote on UNSC Resolution 1973; only six NATO Allies actively participated in the operation.
In spite of their two partnership programs, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the Allies have so far held very different visions of how to deal with the region. This is, in part, a leftover from the Alliance’s first 4 decades, when the Mediterranean and its Southern rim hardly featured outside the Cold War context, and, in part, an outcome of different analysis over which regions should matter to the Alliance beyond the Soviet threat.
Depending on geographical location, the Allies would emphasize the Central, the Northern, or the Southern Front.
Mostly, however, this lack of vision reflects a strong preference of individual Allies for bi- or trilateralism when dealing with this part of the world. As a region of international importance, not only because of large petrol resources but also the existence of maritime choke points and one of the most important world trade routes, it attracts those Allies with strategic interests that might threaten NATO consensus. Yet, if the Alliance wants to continue to reach out into its Southern neighbor area, a common vision will be necessary to achieve that goal.