E’ stata pubblicata la versione non riservata del report della commissione di inchiesta sull’attacco al consolato americano di Bengasi nel quale vengono individuate serie responsabilità a carico del Dipartimento di Stato.
Anche in questo caso, come in molti altri episodi di failure, si sono evidenziate mancanze nel campo della warning intelligence di livello strategico:
[...] The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist.
Terrorist networks are difficult to monitor, and the Board emphasizes the conclusion of previous accountability review boards that vulnerable missions cannot rely on receiving specific warning intelligence. Similarly, the lack of specific threat intelligence does not imply a lessening of probability of a terrorist attack. The Board found that there was a tendency on the part of policy, security and other U.S. government officials to rely heavily on the probability of warning intelligence and on the absence of specific threat information. The result was possibly to overlook the usefulness of taking a hard look at accumulated, sometimes circumstantial information, and instead to fail to appreciate threats and understand trends, particularly based on increased violence and the targeting of foreign diplomats and international organizations in Benghazi.[...]
[...] Post-2001, intelligence collection has expanded exponentially, but the Benghazi attacks are a stark reminder that we cannot over-rely on the certainty or even likelihood of warning intelligence. Careful attention should be given to factors showing a deteriorating threat situation in general as a basis for improving security posture. Key trends must be quickly identified and used to sharpen risk calculations.
Il problema è sempre quello: il “sistema” è troppo orientato verso la current intelligence e dieci anni di contrasto al terrorismo non solo non hanno aiutato a ri-orientarlo ma, anzi, ne hanno esasperato alcuni aspetti.