Conclusasi la “due giorni” di approfondimento sul nuovo Global Trends 2030 possiamo ritornare al flusso usuale di post.
Qui di seguito alcune parti dell’analisi della Jamestown Foundation sulle strategie implementate dal Cremlino per esercitare crescente influenza sullo spazio ex sovietico:
[...] But how exactly is a Moscow-led Eurasian Union supposed to become a global pole of power? Russia’s goal is to turn this grouping into a chorus that will sing in international forums with one voice under a Kremlin choirmaster. The integration mechanism that Russia is willing to implement should create the necessary asymmetric dependencies that would consolidate its leadership position within such a union. For instance the recovery of Soviet-era common transportation and energy infrastructure would magnify economic and political dependence on Russia among many future Eurasian Union members. In the developing economies of the CIS countries, natural gas plays the role of a public good with pronounced social welfare effects. When delivered at low prices—as Russia is willing to offer in exchange for often painful concessions from its importers—natural gas has the potential to significantly affect the political capital of the national leaders. Russia also represents a huge market with lower standards for produced goods, making it more accessible for post-Soviet states.
[...] With so much economic and political influence, Russia will then be able to promote its preferred candidates in national elections along its periphery—and will basically own the national governments. Such an outcome would also trigger a diffusion into neighboring countries of Russia’s political system, which is a form of “smart authoritarianism” mimicking democratic institutions and processes. This type of governance forces its citizens to trade between some minimal level of social welfare assured by the government in exchange for giving up many individual freedoms. The emergence of the Russian-led Eurasian Union would produce a wave of authoritarianism, slowly spreading from East to West, until it reached the borders of the EU.
[...] Consequently, in addition to its diplomatic moves, Russia is making significant efforts to strengthen its military tool of foreign policy. Moscow believes that modernizing its strategic nuclear capabilities to enable Russia to penetrate US missile defense systems would deter the United States from interfering into Russia’s foreign affairs. It is also massively funding its conventional forces, permitting Moscow to create facts on the ground that other actors would have to accept. Currently, Russia is believed to be the third largest defense spender in the world, after the US and China, with its defense expenditures being slightly over three percent of its GDP; while its combined “national defense” and “national security” spending totals over 30 percent of Russia’s annual budget (newizv.ru, October 18). It plans to increase its 2013 defense spending by over 25 percent compared to the current year (Ng.ru, July 19), leading some Russian experts to suggest Moscow is preparing for war (Ria.ru, November 17, 2011).
All these actions indicate that the new Putin administration is consistently building both military and diplomatic tools to support its declared goal of building the Eurasian Union. They also suggest the Kremlin is resolute in limiting interference from the West, willing to militarily deter any possible resistance to the fait accompli reality Moscow is attempting to create in the post-Soviet space.
