Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Kenneth Pollack e Salman Shaikh analizzano in un memo del Saban Center della Brookings Institution i pro ed i contro delle varie opzioni a disposizione del governo statunitense per il cambio di regime in Siria, dalla diplomazia alle sanzioni alle varie forme possibili di coercizione: “Saving Syria: Assessing Options for Regime Change“.
Tra le altre cose scrivono nelle conclusioni gli autori:
The options in this paper offer alternatives for escalation and, at the same time, reasons that escalation would be costly and risky. In the end, policymakers may decide that the price for removing Asad is too high and the consequences for Syria’s long-term stability too uncertain. If so, they must focus on the problem of a weakened but defiant Asad who is also more dependent on Iran. This would require thinking through how to structure sanctions on Syria and regional diplomacy to limit the humanitarian impact on the Syrian people while still maintaining pressure on the Syrian regime. […]
As a final thought, it is always important to keep in mind that failing to act—even failing to decide—is an action and a decision. Not choosing to intervene is the same as choosing not to intervene, and it would be far better that whatever course the United States follows, that it be the product of a conscious decision so that we can pursue it properly, rather than the outcome of a paralyzing indecision that prevents Washington from doing anything to protect this country’s many interests affected by the bloodshed of Syria.