Sul WSJ di oggi è stato pubblicato un articolo sul funzionamento dell'apparato di intelligence libico durante la rivolta: "Inside a Flawed Spy Machine as Gadhafi's Rule Crumbled".
Sulla base di alcuni documenti rinvenuti negli uffici abbandonati i Servizi di Tripoli sembrerebbero essere stati colti di sorpresa dagli eventi, probabilmente sottovalutando la portata della rivolta (nella fase iniziale del conflitto sarebbe mancato un early-warning) e quindi la serietà della minaccia. Almeno fino ad aprile:
"In one memo, dated April 26 and found in the now-abandoned office of Libya's former top spy, a general complains bitterly about the lack of intelligence: "I received no information from anywhere," he wrote. "I now think there isn't any entity at all that has precise or even imprecise information" about the rebels he was being asked to defeat.
Documents from early in the year suggest a casual dismissiveness of the rebellion. One field officer in February—around the start of the crisis—reported to his superiors in Tripoli that the protesters in his city of Al-Marj were merely local alcoholic troublemakers. A report from Tripoli's suburb of Tajoura dismissed marchers there as a nuisance akin to "stray dogs."
By late spring, however, Tripoli's intelligence chiefs were scratching their heads over intercepts of rebel phone calls that they simply couldn't decode (…)
Soon after the rebellion began on Feb. 17, intelligence reports quickly claimed to identify its leaders. The reports reinforced Tripoli's propaganda message, blaming alcoholics, Islamic terrorists, criminals and drug dealers for the unrest.
Of the dozens of field reports reviewed by the Journal at Tripoli's Internal Security headquarters and intelligence headquarters, none addressed the possibility that the rebellion might have broader social support (…).
One typical document, dated Feb. 24 and labeled "Top Secret (…) the report identifies a dozen individuals and families as key organizers of the rebellion. But after having pointed a finger at the families, the report concludes that the real threat doesn't come from them at all. Instead it blames the "Shiite Muslim control" over Al Jazeera television and the BBC's broadcasts in Arabic. "These channels are encouraging the people to revolt," the report says. "They are being organized and directed by Shiites." Libya is predominantly Sunni (…).
One memo contained intercepted phone calls between military commanders in Chad who reported Qatari weapons convoys approaching Libya's southern border with Sudan, apparently intended for anti-Gadhafi forces. Another intelligence memo, dated April 4, warned that French weapons, including Stinger antiaircraft missiles and Milan antitank rockets, were making their way to Libyan rebels via Sudan".
Chicca finale. E' divertente scoprire che anche in Libia si auspicava un ricambio nel (ed una maggiore qualificazione del) personale dei Servizi: "On the desk of Mr. Senussi's deputy are several piles of papers likely among the last reports to have been read there. One of the reports states that "the majority of those currently working for the intelligence administration are ill-prepared to carry out intelligence duties." The author of the report asks for permission to recruit more people "with academic and professional qualifications". Tutto il mondo (dell'Intelligence) è paese…