12 Responses

  1. avatar
    AllegraBrigata at |

    Ci mancava il russo… :)))

    Reply
  2. avatar
    Silendo at |

    :)) io me lo sono tradotto con Google…. 😀

    Reply
  3. avatar
    utente anonimo at |

    …io ce l ho con i sottotitoli in polacco eventualmente!!!!! :-)

    daniele67

    Reply
  4. avatar
    Silendo at |

    :)) eh… tu con le polacche sei proprio fissato :))

    Reply
  5. avatar
    utente anonimo at |

    dove si trova in Polacco?

    Django

    Reply
  6. avatar
    Jackallo at |

    Russo?!?  Ahhhhhhhhhhh.. adesso sì.. :)

    Reply
  7. avatar
    Silendo at |

    Ma dove vai, al giorno d’oggi, se non conosci il russo ed il polacco, scusa…

    Reply
  8. avatar
    Raffox74 at |

     Grrrr…. e lo dite adesso???
    Oggi devo incontrare il teacher di coreano. 

    Reply
  9. avatar
    Jackallo at |

    Ecco, il Coreano è una lingua che mi piacerebbe molto imparare..

    Reply
  10. avatar
    utente anonimo at |

    …buongustaio!!!! :-) lingua rara…molto rara!!! non tiri se non cogli eh!!!! :-)

    un saluto caro a tutti!!

    daniele67

    Reply
  11. avatar
    Silendo at |

    Carissimi, vi allego un commento in inglese:

    Global Insights: Russia’s New Military Doctrine Reaffirms Old Values

    Richard Weitz | 
    09 Feb 2010 

    At a Feb. 5 session of the Russian Security Council, President Dmitry Medvedev finally approved Russia’s updated comprehensive military doctrine, which was published on the president’s Kremlin Web site the following day. But notwithstanding a lengthy period of discussion and consideration, and despite all the developments of the past decade — including the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Georgia — the latest version generally supports the same policies as the previous military doctrine adopted in 2000.

    The doctrine depicts Russia as the target of increasing military threats emanating from NATO collectively and its members individually. It also expresses unease at the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies, the advent of conventional high-precision weapons capable of achieving results previously requiring nuclear weapons, the militarization of outer space, territorial claims against Russia and its allies (as well as interference in their internal affairs), and the spread of global terrorism, interethnic tensions, religious extremism, separatism, and other sources of international tensions. 

    Russia’s 2010 military doctrine expresses particular dissatisfaction with NATO, complaining about the growth of NATO military infrastructure close to Russia’s border as well as the alliance’s alleged efforts to acquire "global functions in contravention of international law." NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, attending this year’s Munich Security Conference, professed to be taken aback by the depiction of the alliance as Russia’s primary security threat, and insisted that "this new doctrine does not reflect the real world" because "NATO is not an enemy of Russia." 

    In operational terms, this latest military doctrine, Russia’s third, does not radically differ from the previous one adopted in 2000. Like its predecessor, the current document stresses the need to avert threats and justifies the use of military force only for defensive purposes. Most importantly, and despite expectations based on earlier Russian government statements, the 2010 doctrine does not expand the range of permissible uses of nuclear weapons to include preventive or preemptive nuclear strikes. 

    Russia’s 2000 military doctrine already stated that, "The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation." Similarly, the 2010 version affirms Russia’s readiness to employ nuclear weapons only in retaliation for the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies. It also allows Russia to use nuclear weapons first when a conventional attack by an aggressor proves so effective that it endangers the Russian state, a provision not in the first 1993 doctrine. 

    In the 2010 military doctrine, as in the 2000 version, the declared purpose of Russian nuclear weapons is to deter other countries from engaging in a military conflict with Russia. But like the United States and the other nuclear weapons states (with the exception of China), the Russian government refuses to adopt a "no nuclear first use" doctrine. In principle, Moscow is prepared to initiate a nuclear war. 

    The current military doctrine identifies four types of military conflicts: small-scale armed conflicts, local wars such as that between Russia and Georgia in 2008, regional wars that can potentially involve many countries, and large-scale conflicts such as World Wars I and II. The doctrine’s authors state that nuclear weapons will continue to help avert the last two types of wars. In peacetime, the doctrine assigns Russia’s armed forces such tasks as fighting terrorism and maritime piracy, maintaining public order, managing emergencies, protecting Russian citizens and interests abroad (including from maritime pirates), and contributing to internationally authorized peacekeeping missions, such as those undertaken by the United Nations or the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. 

    The 2010 doctrine also stresses the need to improve Russia’s capabilities to wage high-precision conventional warfare using sophisticated communications, and command-and-control networks. U.S. forces have demonstrated these capabilities in several recent conventional wars, while Chinese and European militaries have also been developing such assets. The authors expect that contemporary military actions "will be characterized by the growing significance of high-precision, electromagnetic, laser, and infrasound weapons, information control systems, unmanned aerial and autonomous sea vehicles, and autonomous robotic weapons and military technologies." 

    In addition to advocating improvements in Russia’s high-tech conventional capabilities, the 2010 military doctrine also provides support for other elements of Russia’s current defense reform program. The doctrine instructs the Russian military to use its financial, physical, and other resources more efficiently, including by improving military education and training, defense research and development, and the repair and maintenance of existing military equipment. It also calls on the Russian defense and intelligence communities to better anticipate the outbreak of wars and the characteristics of future military conflict. The 2010 version also affirms the need to improve the quality of life of the Russian defense community, including its civilian and retired military personnel, as well as soldiers on active duty and their families. And it stresses the need for Russia to have a world-class high-technology defense industrial sector capable of meeting the demands of both the Russian military and foreign customers. 

    Although U.S. defense officials briefed their Russian colleagues in advance about the content of the recently released U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), neither the U.S. nor the Russian doctrinal writers appear to have taken the other’s declaratory doctrine into account when composing their own text. Whereas the current Russian military doctrine basically describes U.S. actions as threatening Russia, the QDR characterizes Russia as a potential partner in U.S. efforts to combat WMD proliferation, terrorism, and ballistic missile threats. We thus have a conceptual asymmetry in which Russian defense planners are preoccupied with hypothetical U.S. and NATO threats, while American strategists are seeking Russia’s help in winning the war in Afghanistan, as well as countering international terrorists and states of proliferation concern, like Iran.

    One interesting question is whether Russia’s latest military doctrine will affect the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which is being completed this month, or NATO’s revised Strategic Concept, due out later this year. My expectation is that the NPR authors will remain focused on how extensively to support President Barack Obama’s vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world, whereas NATO planners will try to assuage the Russian defense concerns depicted in the recent military doctrine — as well as other Russian government statements and actions — though perhaps with little effect.

    Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor. His weekly WPR column, Global Insights, appears every Tuesday.

    Reply
  12. avatar
    Silendo at |
    Reply

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