16 Responses

  1. avatar
    Jackallo at |

    Anche io oggi riflettevo su questa cosa, dopo aver letto sul Sole24Ore proprio un articolo su quanto avvenuto.
    Si sta sottovalutando troppo (e da troppo tempo) la capacità di pianificazione strategica di questa gente, fatta non solo di "pastori primitivi", ma anche, soprattutto le seconde generazioni, di persone cresciute con gli stessi agi e la stessa nostra possibilità di accesso all’informazione e alla cultura.

    Ho trovato interessante, in tal senso, anche la lettura di un articolo sull’ultimo numero di GNOSIS ed intitolato "La persuasione nell’era digitale", dove l’Autore spiega gli "step", da un punto di vista di strategia psicologica, che vengono utilizzati per il "reclutamento in Rete" di questi giovani. Chi muove al martirio questa gente sta, a mio avviso, capitalizzando ottimamente il gap culturale e strategico che ci separa, utilizzando proprio chi questo gap non l’ha vissuto o lo può colmare in maniera molto più agevole, perchè nato su territorio americano o europeo.
    Anche questo è un segno che stiamo sottovalutando le loro potenzialità.

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  2. avatar
    utente anonimo at |

    Silendo non vorrei fare il solito complottista di turno.. ma conoscendo il livello informativo e/o tecnologico di Al Qaeda beh… è come dire che un bambino tira giu’ uno Stealth con la fionda.. :-)
    Dire che qualcosa non torna.. è dir poco.. Ma mi faccio i..zzi miei che è meglio.
    Beh, poi voi siete liberi di credere a quel che studiate e leggete….
    Ma per me dietro ci sta qualcos’altro….. pensate ad esempio che Riina era un contadino.. e magari vi si accende la lampadina

    Clone

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  3. avatar
    utente anonimo at |

    approposito dello Stealth.. non era una soffiata russa ai serbi? 😉 almeno questa è la leggenda che circolava in quei giorni camminando per Pristina..
    Eppure pensate che se finissero ‘ste guerre ci sarebbero ancora più disoccupati.. oooppss…

    Clone

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  4. avatar
    Silendo at |

    Dal Times:

    "US intelligence officials believe that the suicide bomb attack that killed seven CIA officers in Afghanistan last month was planned with the help of Osama bin Laden’s close allies, raising fears that the al-Qaeda leader is enjoying a lethal resurgence.

    They think that the attack could not have taken place without the prior knowledge and assistance of the Haqqanis, the powerful Taleban group thought to be shielding bin Laden (…)

    Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA unit tracking bin Laden, said: “There is no way this operation would have occurred in Khost without the knowledge and active support of Jalaluddin Haqqani and/or his son.

    They and their organisation own the area and nothing occurs that would  impact their tribe or its allies without their knowledge or OK. Both men, moreover, would be delighted to help bin Laden in any way they can.”

    Mahmood Shah, who served as security chief of Pakistan’s lawless tribal region, agreed: “The attack may have been planned by al-Qaeda, but it could not have been possible without the help of the Haqqani group.”

    What has alarmed the US is the fact that al-Qaeda and the Taleban  managed, despite an intense US bombing campaign, to mount an  operation that wiped out the top CIA experts involved in the hunt for bin Laden. “It’s a huge blow,” a former CIA officer said. “If you are Osama bin Laden, your biggest enemy is the CIA. This is a big hit.”

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  5. avatar
    utente anonimo at |

     LA SAGA DELL’AGENTE "TRIPLO" CHE HA FATTO STRAGE ALLA CIA

    di G. OLIMPO sul Corriere della Sera del 5 c.m.

    BABBANO ASIMMETRICO

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  6. avatar
    utente anonimo at |

    Abbiamo schemi mentali diversi.
    Quello che può sembrare contorto per un occidentale potrebbe non esserlo per un non-occidentale ( sia esso asiatico, arabo e/o africano ) . Semplicemente i neuroni sono legati in maniera diversa.

    3all

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  7. avatar
    Silendo at |

    Gli agenti uccisi in questo articolo del New York Times.

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  8. avatar
    utente anonimo at |

    ……" ma conoscendo il livello informativo e/o tecnologico di Al Qaeda beh… è come dire che un bambino tira giu’ uno Stealth con la fionda.. :-)" 
    …….  O  DUE TORRI  CON DUE  AEREI  ;-))

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  9. avatar
    utente anonimo at |
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  10. avatar
    utente anonimo at |
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  11. avatar
    Silendo at |

    A proposito delle capacità di contro-intelligence di Al Qaeda vi segnalo questa riflessione di Reuel Marc Gerecht appena pubblicata sul Wall Street Journal e segnalatami da Jackall: "The Meaning of Al Qaeda’s Double Agent".

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  12. avatar
    AllegraBrigata at |

    Ne parla anche Ignatius sul Post:

    In terms of loss of life, the bombing of the CIA base in Khost, Afghanistan, may be the most costly mistake in the agency’s history. So it’s important to look carefully for clues about how it happened and lessons for the future.

    CIA veterans cite a series of warning signs that the agency wasn’t paying enough attention to the counterintelligence threat posed by al-Qaeda. These danger signals weren’t addressed because the agency underestimated its adversary and overestimated its own skills and those of its allies.

    The time to fix these problems is now — not with a spasm of second-guessing that will further weaken the CIA but through the agency’s own adaptation to this war zone. As the Khost attack made painfully clear, the CIA needs better tradecraft for this conflict.

    By getting a suicide bomber inside a CIA base, the al-Qaeda network showed that it remains a sophisticated adversary, despite intense pressure from CIA Predator attacks (…)

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  13. avatar
    Silendo at |

    Interessante…

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  14. avatar
    Silendo at |

    A Lack of Intelligence – by Stratfor

    January 8, 2010 | 1211 GMT

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SURFACED ON THURSDAY about the familial background of the Jordanian suicide bomber who detonated himself Dec. 30 at Forward Operating Base Chapman in eastern Afghanistan. The bomb killed seven CIA officials, making it the deadliest attack against the U.S. foreign intelligence service in over a quarter of a century. Meanwhile, two additional attacks struck the same region. One targeted the acting governor of Khost province, who escaped with minor injuries. The second involved a suicide bomber who targeted a convoy of security vehicles in the capital of Paktia province, killing eight people including the commander of an Afghan security force.

    These latest attacks represent a recent spike in Taliban activity along the Pakistani border in eastern Afghanistan. At the heart of the Afghan Taliban’s ability to expand the geography, frequency and intensity of their attacks is their intelligence capabilities. After the fall of their regime in late 2001, Taliban activity was pushed back into their home turf in southern Afghanistan. For the longest time, eastern Afghanistan didn’t see as much activity as was taking place in the south.

    Now, however, the provinces running north to south along the Pakistani border — Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Logar, Paktia, Khost, and Paktika –- together constitute the single largest regional Taliban command in Afghanistan. Its leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, has emerged as the most prominent Afghan Taliban regional commander reporting (albeit nominally) to the Mullah Omar-led leadership. Haqqani’s power projection capabilities have reached a point where people in the area — who just three years back weren’t interested in the Taliban — are now supporting the jihadists.

     

    This is one of the key reasons why the United States over the course of the last two years has escalated its unmanned aerial vehicle strikes across the border into the Pakistani tribal belt where many of these Afghan Taliban and their local and transnational allies maintain safe havens. From the Afghan side of the border, we have learned that the power of the Taliban has reached the point where delegations from district, provincial and even the central government come to the Taliban and ask the jihadists not to attack them in exchange for material support and information, particularly about U.S.-NATO movements.

    Herein lies the heart of the problem. The Taliban not only maintain an intelligence edge over U.S. and NATO forces, they continue to improve upon it. In contrast, Washington and its NATO allies have only recently begun to seriously gather intelligence on the Taliban and their transnational allies. Back in April 2008, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) chief Gen. David Petraeus acknowledged that the United States lacked “rigorous, granular, nuanced” intelligence on Afghanistan.

    The killing of the seven agency officials shows that the problem is acute and has to do with developing the means of gathering the intelligence, let alone obtaining it. The intelligence community is obviously taking steps to ensure the security of those engaged in the intelligence gathering as well as improving the process itself. The bigger challenge is being able to counter the Taliban’s intelligence moves, not just in terms of the jihadists obtaining information that allows them to enhance their operational capabilities, but also from the point of view of disrupting U.S.-NATO operations.

    The need for intelligence is not simply limited to executing an effective counterinsurgency campaign that can undermine the Taliban momentum. This intelligence problem also impacts another key aspect of President Obama’s strategy, which is to be able to build up Afghan security forces over the course of the next three years. Achieving this goal becomes a Herculean task if the Taliban has deep penetration into these services as well as the offices of their political masters.

    STRATFOR has mentioned in the past that the one actor that can potentially help the United States overcome its intelligence deficit on the Taliban is Pakistan. But the significant variance between the strategic calculus of Islamabad and Washington for the region, and Pakistan’s own loss of control over the cross-border Taliban phenomenon has thus far prevented any meaningful intelligence cooperation. But if both sides are going to be able to deal with their respective Taliban problems, it will be the result of intelligence cooperation.

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  15. avatar
    utente anonimo at |
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  16. avatar
    utente anonimo at |
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