Interessante articolo di Amir Taheri (di cui consiglio l’intera raccolta che trovate qui ). Taheri è considerato uno dei più informati commentatori iraniani.
‘UNHELPFUL": So British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw described ‘s announcement that it has now joined "the nuclear club." Straw’s French and German colleagues did no better. One saw ‘s provocative move as "regrettable the other preferred "disappointing." The European trio was echoing earlier comments from
Well, as the late Raymond Aaron liked to say, when you say that something is "unacceptable," you have already accepted it as a reality. As for "unhelpful," that adjective is normally used in conjugal disputes when the aggrieved spouse wishes to say something without causing further aggravation.
Any thought that such moaning might make the mullahs shake in their sandals, let alone abandon their strategic quest for a nuclear surge capacity, would be naive to say the least. It’s "so far, so good" for
Let us return to the central question in all this: Why does the Islamic Republic want a nuclear arsenal?
Anyone familiar with the history of proliferation would know that all of the seven confirmed nuclear powers decided to go nuclear in the context of conflict, actual or potential, with a clearly designated adversary. The developed nuclear weapons during World War II. Later, the Soviets developed their own bomb as a deterrent against the Americans. and , and later , each sought an independent deterrent against the . Then , as a deterrent against – and as a deterrent against .
No nation allocates huge resources to building a bomb and the means to deliver it without some real or perceived strategic imperative. So what is that imperative for ?
The shah’s regime sought a nuclear surge capacity with an eye on making the Soviets deem it too risky to attack . Sometime in the early ’90s, the Islamic Republic decided to revive that program as a counter to the .
The Islamic Republic, as the embodiment of the Khomeinist revolution, had assumed a messianic mission to conquer the
The leadership in
In 1986-87, it was U.S. intervention that prevented Iran from breaking the Arab front by attacking Kuwaiti and Saudi oil tankers. It was also partly thanks to U.S. intervention that the Khomeinists weren’t allowed to seize control of Lebanon and launch a long, low-intensity war against Israel.
With the fall of the Taliban in Kabul and the Ba’ath in Iraq, the old balance of power in the region has been shattered. President Bush wants to create a new Middle East that is democratic and pro-West. In such a Middle East, there would be no place for a regime like the one now in place in Tehran. The Islamic Republic is determined to sabotage Bush’s plan and, instead, create a new Middle East that is anti-American, Islamist and controlled by Tehran. These conflicting ambitions make war a theoretical, if not an immediate, inevitability.
The Khomeinist leadership believes that it could hope to win in any prolonged conventional conflict if only because public opinion, as the experience has shown, lacks patience and is unprepared to accept even low casualty rates. That leaves tactical nuclear weapons as the only way for the to break the will of the Islamic Republic in any war. Thus the mullahs’ move to develop their own deterrent.
A that is unable to fight on the ground for any length of time and deterred from using nuclear weapons for fear of retaliation would, so the mullahs hope, do what it has often done: run away, leaving to emerge as the regional superpower.
All three options are hard to contemplate, especially for the and its European allies – powers that wish to set the global agenda but are reluctant to fight for it. The problem is that by refusing to stand up against the Khomeinist regime now, the Americans and Europeans (and their allies in the Arab world) may later have to fight an even bigger and costlier war against a nuclear-armed foe.