A highly classified intelligence report produced for the new director of national intelligence concludes that U.S. spy agencies failed to recognize several key military developments in China in the past decade, The Washington Times has learned.
The report was created by several current and former intelligence officials and concludes that U.S. agencies missed more than a dozen Chinese military developments, according to officials familiar with the report.
The report blames excessive secrecy on China’s part for the failures, but critics say intelligence specialists are to blame for playing down or dismissing evidence of growing Chinese military capabilities.
The report comes as the Bush administration appears to have become more critical of China’s military buildup.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said in Singapore over the weekend that China has hidden its defense spending and is expanding its missile forces despite facing no threats. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also expressed worries this week about China’s expanding military capabilities.
Among the failures highlighted in the study are:
•China’s development of a new long-range cruise missile.
•The deployment of a new warship equipped with a stolen Chinese version of the U.S. Aegis battle management technology.
•Deployment of a new attack submarine known as the Yuan class that was missed by U.S. intelligence until photos of the submarine appeared on the Internet.
•Development of precision-guided munitions, including new air-to-ground missiles and new, more accurate warheads.
•China’s development of surface-to-surface missiles for targeting U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups.
•The importation of advanced weaponry, including Russian submarines, warships and fighter-bombers.
According to officials familiar with the intelligence report, the word "surprise" is used more than a dozen times to describe U.S. failures to anticipate or discover Chinese arms development.
Many of the missed military developments will be contained in the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on the Chinese military, which was due out March 1 but delayed by interagency disputes over its contents.
Critics of the study say the report unfairly blames intelligence collectors for not gathering solid information on the Chinese military and for failing to plant agents in the communist government.
Instead, these officials said, the report looks like a bid to exonerate analysts within the close-knit fraternity of government China specialists, who for the past 10 years dismissed or played down intelligence showing that Beijing was engaged in a major military buildup.
"This report conceals the efforts of dissenting analysts [in the intelligence community] who argued that China was a threat," one official said, adding that covering up the failure of intelligence analysts on China would prevent a major reorganization of the system.
A former U.S. official said the report should help expose a "self-selected group" of specialists who fooled the U.S. government on China for 10 years.
"This group’s desire to have good relations with China has prevented them from highlighting how little they know and suppressing occasional evidence that China views the United States as its main enemy."
The report has been sent to Thomas Fingar, a longtime intelligence analyst on China who was recently appointed by John D. Negroponte, the new director of national intelligence, as his office’s top intelligence analyst.
Mr. Negroponte has ordered a series of top-to-bottom reviews of U.S. intelligence capabilities in the aftermath of the critical report by the presidential commission headed by Judge Laurence Silberman and former Sen. Charles Robb, Virginia Democrat.
According to the officials, the study was produced by a team of analysts for the intelligence contractor Centra Technologies.
Spokesmen for the CIA and Mr. Negroponte declined to comment.
Its main author is Robert Suettinger, a National Security Council staff member for China during the Clinton administration and the U.S. intelligence community’s top China analyst until 1998. Mr. Suettinger is traveling outside the country and could not be reached for comment, a spokesman said.
John Culver, a longtime CIA analyst on Asia, was the co-author.
Among those who took part in the study were former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Lonnie Henley, who critics say was among those who in the past had dismissed concerns about China’s military in the past 10 years.
Also participating in the study was John F. Corbett, a former Army intelligence analyst and attache who was a China policy-maker at the Pentagon during the Clinton administration.
Diciamo che negli ultimi lustri i servizi USA hanno cappellato più di qualche volta.
Diciamo pure che senza un certo numero di operativi sul terreno, formulare analisi è impossibile.
Direi che non siamo in grado di dire se gli operativi ci sono o meno. Io propendo per il si. Ma ovviamente posso sbagliarmi. I servizi americani devono valutate talmente tanti fattori che, per analogia, potremmo li paragonare ad una colonna corazzata efficiente che talvolta si allontana dalle linee di rifornimento e ogni tanto rimane a secco. In iraq hanno fatto delle errate valutazioni sullo scenario post bellico, si sono lasciati sfuggire con leggerezza i nomi dei militari coinvolti nel caso Calipari, a esempio.
Ma mi rendo conto che fare solo qualche citazione potrebbe portarci ad errori grossolani. L’argomento meriterebbe un’analisi molto più approfondita.
Non sono d’accordo e mi spiego.
Il numero degli operativi è conosciuto, grazie alle Commissioni del Congresso.
Ci sono 2000 agenti (dati aggiornati al 2002, se non erro). L’80% opera sotto copertura ufficiale (sto andando a memoria, per cui potrei sbagliare di qualche punto percentuale). In pratica, gli USA non hanno elementi in grado di penetrare strutture terroristiche. Tanto che fanno ricorso ai Servizi “alleati” o presunti tali. Se pensi che questi “presunti tali” sono staterelli come la Siria o il Pakistan, avrai un quadro più approfondito della situazione.
Si fa un gran parlare dei mali dell’intelligence USA. Il problema è che, in genere, a parlarne sono persone che non hanno “perso tempo” a studiarsi la valanga di documenti disponibili. Chi lo fa non ha dubbi: il problema è uno. Mancano gli uomini. Mancano le spie.
Riguardo allo scenario post-bellico… lì il problema è una diretta conseguenza dell’assenza di personale in loco. Ma anche qui c’è da fare una precisazione. Si sapeva che ci sarebbero stati problemi e la colpa della mancata, conseguente, implementazione è tutta del Ministro Rumsfeld che ha deciso di non rafforzare il contingente.
Pochi soldati=scarso o nullo controllo del territorio=via libera alla guerriglia.
Ho controllato: 2500 agenti operativi, il 98% dei quali opera sotto coperatura ufficiale (si sa che sono agenti governativi, ma non che sono della CIA…). Quindi solo il 2% sono NOC (Non Official Cover).
Meno male che dovevi andare in palestra…
Non mi andava più…
Allora puoi fare a meno di fare lo stronzo come al solito.